Buzzer team members are also tasked with promoting news content, starting conversations, and engaging in comment sections of articles and threads. Additionally, the work of buzzer groups often begins long before the campaign season. Preparatory work includes the identification of potential collaborators and influencers, following accounts of politicians and gently beginning to interact, thus creating an illusion that these accounts are real characters who have emerged organically (Renaldi, 2018). Examples of coordinated activity by such accounts vary widely. Some accounts focus on day-to-day praise for leaders, and conveying messages that aren’t necessarily related to elections but rather seem to be the common thoughts of an average citizen. One buzz group member said that there are accounts that his group manages that tweet about government-led infrastructure developments, Widodo diplomacy success, and national unity (strongly implying that the central government also utilizes buzz groups) (Lamb, 2018a). Other accounts were found to post identical tweets with identical political content, such as articles or pictures, within a very close timeframe. This kind of behavior typically implies that a either a single person or a tight network of people operate the accounts, often coordinated through WhatsApp (DFRLab 2019). Disinformation: In addition to coordinated content promotion, spreading fake news is also a common strategy used by social media manipulators in Indonesia. Many groups deliberately spread fake news in order to discredit political opponents and to escalate ethno-religious tensions. Saracen, for example, was an online syndicate that spread bluntly fake stories that evoked racist and sectarian sentiments. At its height, the organization’s Facebook page had over 800,000 followers and thousands more on other platforms (Renaldi 2017). Other notable examples of fake news included the widely spread rumors that before the 2014 elections that Widodo is opposed to Islam, is ethnically Chinese and is a communist. The rumors were so widely shared that some citizens still say that Widodo is a member of the banned Indonesian Communist Party (Lamb, 2019b). Incitement: Some strategies promote de facto violence in the offline world. A strategy commonly associated with the MCA, known as doxing, involves collecting personal information of individuals accused of insulting Islam and circulating it with harmful intent. The MCA maintained a Facebook page dubbed “Database of People Wanted by the Muslim Community”, which included sensitive personal information of the group’s targets (Juniarto, 2018). In 2017, there were over 100 known cases in which doxing by the MCA led to intimidation and violent attacks, as well as the video recording of confessions under duress (Lamb, 2018b). The MCA has also released videos of targeted people under the caption “Blasphemer Hunter Team”, urging viewers to report other people who insulted the religion (Ibid). Table 2: Observed Strategies, Tools and Techniques of Social Media Manipulation in Indonesia Account Types Messaging and Valence Content and Platforms Communication Strategies Fake, Real, Bots Anti-opposition, Pro-party, Disinformation, Facebook, Twitter, pro-government, Incitement, Amplification of content, YouTube, smear campaigns promoting hashtags WhatsApp Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. 190