Brazil Introduction Organised social media manipulation strategies for political campaigning emerged in Brazil as early as 2010. These early efforts included the use of fake accounts to disseminate content in support of Dilma Rousseff propaganda, as well as misinformation about opposition candidate José Serra via blogs and Orkut, Brazil’s main social media channel at the time (Gragnani, 2018a). In her second presidential election in 2014 it played a major role in the campaigns of Rousseff and Aecio Neves, as well as in later regional elections, and it became crucial in the campaign that ultimately led to her impeachment (Arnaudo, 2017). The use of computational propaganda has increased year-on-year. Prior to the 2018 general elections, Brazilian authorities were aware of and responsive to the threat of online disinformation, and even introduced standard practices to prevent these strategies from contaminating campaigns. In 2017, the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), the body responsible for running the elections in Brazil, passed electoral reforms that explicitly prohibited fake accounts, automation, and disinformation for campaign purposes (Resolução No 23.551/2017, n.d.). However, freedom of expression continues to be undermined in Brazil, with attacks on opposition parties and the deployment of disinformation and hate speech, which has become “more explicit every day” (Santana, 2020). Journalists who are critical of the government, such as Patricia Campos Mello, Constança Rezende, and Glenn Greenwald, are not only being targeted by Bolsonaro's supporters, but also by serving politicians who openly encourage attacks and hate speech, particularly against minorities. For instance, in one of his YouTube addresses Jair Bolsonaro attacked Bianca Santana, a black journalist and activist exposed the links between Bolsonaro’s family and the paramilitary group behind the killing of councilwoman Marielle Franco in 2018 (Santana, 2020). It is also worth noting that in late June 2020, the Senate passed a law holding online platforms with more than two million users to regulate themselves to stop the creation and spread of disinformation and defamatory content. Moreover, the bill bans mass messaging and asks instant messaging apps to “store message chains forwarded over a thousand times for 15 days, so that the source of the content that goes viral can be identifies if legally required” (Mari, 2020). It also addresses the disclosure of spending, targeted audiences, and identification of the responsible entity for political campaign ads if legally required to do so (Mari, 2020). An Overview of Cyber Troop Activity in Brazil Organizational Form During the October 2018 presidential elections, Movimento Brasil Livre (MBL) a political party running for the first time, shared false information on their portals (Maleronka & Declercq, 2018). Bolsonaro’s campaign also employed bulk messaging and coordinated influence campaigns, often using disinformation, among other strategies to attack the opposition. There is significant evidence that both Flávio and Eduardo Bolsonaro were actively involved in their father’s campaign, with their phone numbers having been linked to the administration of at least nine and eleven pro-Bolsonaro WhatsApp groups, respectively. Additional collaborators acted as content curators, shared disinformation, and monitored groups (Nemer, 2020), in some cases being paid for these activities (Nemer, 2019). Some of these groups remain active at the time of writing. Other supporters formed part of a virtual 58