Table 1: Organizational Form and Prevalence of Social Media Manipulation in Bolivia Initial Government Politicians Private Contractors Civil Society Citizens & Report Agencies & Parties Organizations Influencers 2016 National Direction of IDEIA, Neurona Luis Suarez Networks within the Ministry of Communication (during Morales’ presidency) Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. Strategies, Tools, and Techniques Under Morales’ government, its cybertroopers focused their social media activities on identifying information and accounts that were critical to the government and countering their narratives, as well as trolling the opposition («Analysis: Fires, fake news and “digital warriors” roil Bolivia election race», 2019; Díaz Arnau, 2020a). However, there is not enough analysis of their activities and strategies. With the crisis triggered by the accusations of irregularities in the 2019 general elections in 2019, several journalists, academics, and activists examined and reported on the use of social media manipulation techniques intended to support the interim government. Evidence of trolling campaigns, the mass creation of new accounts for amplification, copypasta messages, and disinformation have been seen in the last months of 2019. Campaigns were not only targeted to local audiences but to foreign audiences as well. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported the existence of a campaign aimed at harassing former officials of Evo Morales’ government and activists of the Movement for Socialism party (MAS) during the weeks of protests in 2019. Many of them were physically harmed, with their homes looted or burnt down. Additionally, and in some cases prior to the physical riots, their home addresses, telephone numbers, and other personal data were disseminated through WhatsApp, Facebook, and other platforms. Independent and community journalists were also targeted, and information about the hotels where foreign journalists were staying at was also disseminated and many of them had to leave the country due to the lack of security guarantees (Organization of American States, 2019). Julián Marcías Tovar also identified at least 68,000 newly created accounts, activated between 18 October and 20 November, that supported the campaign against Morales— some of which were already active before his resignation—and more than 25,000 were created on 11 December (Graph 1). They promoted and amplified a campaign in favour of the interim government, spreading the appearance of a broad acceptance of the interim government (Gallagher, 2019). Additionally, according to researcher Rodrigo Quiroga, 23,900 new accounts created between 11 and 12 November 2019 followed Camacho, who increased his followers from 2,000 to more than 135,000; similarly, Áñez increased her followers base from 8,000 to 168,000 (del Castillo, 2019). Some of these accounts also followed members of Morales’ MAS. However, their tweets and interactions supported the interim government (del Castillo, 2019). 50