specific purpose of pushing out a huge volume of propaganda and disinformation” (McLaughlin, 2018). Both the BJP and INC accuse each other of propagating “fake news” while denying they do so themselves (Kalra, 2018). And Amit Malviya, head of the BJP’s IT cell, publicly acknowledged that there was “some scope for misinformation” during the 2019 election (Dasgupta, 2018). International disinformation campaigns with links to India have also been reported. An influence network linked to Indian actors was identified by the EU Disinfo Lab, comprising over 265 fake local news sites in more than sixty-five countries. For example, the website EP Today (a self-proclaimed magazine for the European Parliament in Brussels) is managed by Indian stakeholders with ties to a large network of think tanks, NGOs, and companies from the Srivastava Group. The network was found to cover Indian-related demonstrations and events, as well as anti-Pakistan content (EUDisinfoLab, 2019). Automation Automation is used by political actors in India to create inorganic popularity around an individual, organization, or message. During the 2014 general election, the BJP were accused of paying to boost their popularity artificially on social media. On Twitter, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is second only to United States President Donald Trump as the most followed politician, with 45.9 million followers; however, a study by Twiplomacy claimed that as many as 60% of these come from fake accounts (Twitter Audit, 2018). There is evidence of active networks of Twitter bots being deployed during the election to boost Modi’s popularity. In February 2019, the hashtag #TNwelcomesModi received 777,000 mentions over two days, referencing Modi’s visit to Tamil Nadu, a southern Indian state. In response, #GoBackModi was mentioned 447,000 times by INC-supporting accounts (@DFRLab, 2019). Despite the high levels of automation on Twitter, this activity did not reach very many people, as the unsophisticated fake accounts had few followers. Following the Indian government’s digital blackout in Jammu and Kashmir, social media accounts have been amplifying political hashtags such as #KashmirWelcomesChange and #KashmirWithModi. The hashtags were shared by media outlets (e.g. @TimesNow, 9.2 million followers), but also by “a range of anonymous accounts that exhibited suspicious and bot-like tendencies” (@DFRLab, 2020). Trolling Trolling tactics have been used to suppress political speech and dissenting opinions. In the book I am a Troll, Indian journalist Swati Chaturvedi details the creation of the BJP’s IT cell, also known as the ‘BJP troll army,’ which was formed in 2007 by Prodyut Bora to smear and threaten opponents online (Dasgupta, 2018). Today, around three hundred workers use “strategies meant to inflame sectarian differences, malign the Muslim minority, and portray Modi as saviour of the Hindus” (Riley, Michael et al., 2018). These attacks vary in their sophistication: from crudely automated criticism, such as #GoBackModi, to highly personalized attacks on individuals. Trolls target political opponents and journalists—especially prominent female figures—with sexual harassment and abuse. Sometimes individuals are threatened with real-life physical attacks by online trolls (Gopalakrishnan, 2018). For example, the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights called for the government to protect journalist Rana Ayyub, after her face was superimposed on pornographic clips and she received rape and murder threats following false quotes attributed to her on social media (Shaheen, 2018). Kavita Krishnan, a politician and activist, said she received nonstop harassment on Twitter from an 179