her local election campaign for Mayor of Guayaquil). However, there is no further evidence of manipulation techniques in this campaign («Secretaría Nacional de Inteligencia gastó $ 7,1 millones para desprestigiar a opositor Galo Lara», 2019). It is also worth mentioning that a network of sixteen agencies was also associated with computational propaganda operations. Most of them shared the same official address as Ximah Digital SA, the long-time contractor. Ximah Digital initially acted as the country's exclusive Twitter sales channel, as it already had connections with the government and in 2014 it was revealed that well-known pro-government troll accounts were managed by its employees. Years later it moved towards more sophisticated operations (eg. AI), and now exports its services and "trains other digital agencies to be trolls" (Carpenter-Arévalo, 2019). Correa’s government also used the website Somos+ to investigate and respond to social media users who criticized it. There have also been several reports of state-sponsored ‘troll farms’ in Ecuador. An investigation conducted by Fundación Mil Hojas in 2015 revealed that Correa had hired businesses to run “troll centers”—offices (Alpert, 2018). Catalina Botero, former Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, has reported that investigations had tracked the IP addresses of such troll farms and linked them to computers in government offices (Freedom House, 2017a). Moreover, it has been stated that high-ranking officials such as Fernando Alvarado, Secretary of Communication (Lara-Dillon, 2012), were involved in operations to harass journalists and critics. In November 2016, leaked documents related to publicist Kenneth Godwin revealed a proposal to use public funds to hire companies (Inteligencia Emocional and Kronopio) for the creation and expansion of political propaganda supporting the Ecuadorian government. These companies maintained a close relationship with Vinicio Alvarado Espinel, a high-ranking government official. After the change of administration, the landscape of coordinated campaigns changed. However, even if minor, there is evidence of continuing operations by Correist accounts. In fact, the National Communications Secretariat denounced in early 2019 the phenomenon that fake social media accounts were using manipulation techniques to discredit Moreno and his government (Freedom House, 2019). This followed an earlier accusation in 2017 that institutional accounts, such as “Enlace Ciudadano”, were posting unauthorized content (Freedom House, 2019). Finally, it is worth noting that in July 2020 Facebook removed accounts and pages on Instagram and Facebook, which originated in Canada and Ecuador and were targeting other countries in Latin America. The company linked these accounts to Canada-based Ecuadorian PR firm Estraterra and "political consultants and former government employees in Ecuador" (Gleicher, 2020). Estraterra was created in July 2016 by Roberto Wohlgemuth (former advisor at the National Secretary of Public Administration), Pablo Yánez (former vice minister of Tourism), and María Augusta Enríquez (former advisor to the ministry of Production led by Vinicio Alvarado Espinel) (Tres exfuncionarios de Rafael Correa crearon Estraterra S.A., vetada ahora por Facebook, 2020, DFRLab, 2020). They were closer to Vinicio and Fernando Alvarado, who were central to the propaganda strategy during Correa’s electoral campaigns and administration. Giovanni López, Jr., former technical assistant for media and public relations for the vice 117

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