Ecuador Introduction Before the elections in Ecuador in 2017, there was substantial evidence that former President Rafael Correa had established a series of troll farms in order to spread pro-government messages, discredit the opposition, and suppress political dissent and journalistic freedom. His government also controlled and blocked content “based on copyright infringement, specially targeted to political activists” (Rofrío et al., 2019). On one occasion, Correa used a speech to name and shame people who had written abusive comments about him on Twitter and Facebook, revealing three people's full names, ages, and addresses (BBC News, 2015). Beyond government-run troll-farms, the 2017 elections in Ecuador also demonstrated evidence of social media manipulation. The general elections of 2017 represented an inflection point, for after ten years in office, Rafael Correa was not eligible for re-election (Rofrío et al., 2019). Following the inauguration of newly-elected President Lenin Moreno, according to Freedom House (2019) internet freedom has improved and there have been fewer instances of disinformation and of coordinated campaigns on social media. However, there is evidence of continuing operations by accounts related to the previous government, especially during significant events. An Overview of Cyber Troop Activity in Ecuador. Organizational Form According to the civil society organization Fundameios, the spread of misinformation during Correa’s administration came from political actors representing both the government and opposition parties. Both sides were involved directly and indirectly in the design and dissemination of falsified, altered, and decontextualized content, in order to confuse the population (Fundamedios, 2017). The National Secretary of Intelligence also contracted private companies, such as Emerging MC de México SA de CV, Illuminati Lab, Ximah Digital SA, Eye Watch, and more, to pursue organized manipulation operations since 2014 («Secretaría Nacional de Inteligencia gastó $ 7,1 millones para desprestigiar a opositor Galo Lara», 2019; Tronchoni, 2020). Gastón Douek and Carlos Ibañez Constantino created Emerging MC de México SA de CV in 2009, using the company to manage operations related to the government’s goal to perform surveillance on Galo Lara, the main opposition leader, with the aim of securing his extradition. They also have other brands, including Tantra Soft SA, Nicestream, Eye Watch, and Illuminati Lab. Illuminati Lab helped Correa’s presidential campaign in 2013 and managed the government relations with Ares Rights to take down unfavourable online content and made the government’s initial contact with Hacking Team. Eye Team, on the other hand, was used to hack web sites critical of Correa's administration, attacked Galo Lara, and collapse the web site Bananaleaks—containing leaks from Correa's administration—and created a copy with distorted content (Tronchoni, 2020). In addition to this, Ximah Digital has been in liquidation since 6 August 2019 by order of the Superintendency of Companies. Javier Sarmiento Fierro and Juan Carlos Váscones are the two shareholders and, until Fernando Alvarado Espinel took over the Ministry of Communication, they received contracts from the government for work with Ximah Digital and other brands they owned. Ximah Digital was also known for working for Lenin Moreno (at an initial phase before he grew estranged from Correa, but there are no further details), and Cynthia Viteri (for 116