There were also cases of defamation transmitted over anonymous blogs (IACHR, 2020). Other messages urged people to physically attack or condemn targeted individuals (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2020). When Iván Velásquez, head of the CICIG, was declared persona non grata by President Morales, fake accounts targeted defamation campaigns against Velásquez, with messages disseminated on Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp both by these accounts and others related to right-wing commentators (Abbas et al., 2019; Currier & Mackey, 2018). Thelma Aldana, former Attorney General of Guatemala, was also subject to collateral aggression (Currier & Mackey, 2018), and when she ran for president in 2019 she was “one of the most targeted individuals in Guatemala” (Abbas et al., 2019). In fact, it was during the presidential elections in 2015 and 2019 that attacks increased (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2020). As Edison Lanza stated, stigmatization and defamation were not only present on social media but also in Morales’ own statements (IACHR, 2020). He labelled journalists and the media as “unfair”, “illegal”, “liars”, and expressed intentions of attacking those who criticized the government, including La Hora, Guatevisión, Prensa Libre, and Emisoras Unidos (IACHR, 2020). Human rights defenders, such as Helen Mack (Abbas et al., 2019) and Juan Francisco Sandoval (Head of the Special Prosecutor's Office Against Impunity) (Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala, 2019), and journalists were also targeted by net centres. Table 2: Observed Strategies, Tools and Techniques of Social Media Manipulation in Guatemala Account Types Messaging and Valence Content and Platforms Communication Strategies Bots, Human. Fake and hacked. Pro-government, pro-party, Attack opposition, Suppressing speech Disinformation, Trolls, Amplifying content Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. Organizational Capacity and Resources According to several reports (Currier & Mackey, 2018; Los Netcenters: Negocio de manipulación—Luis Assardo—Medium, s. f.), it is understood that net centres are related to “more conventional online marketing businesses”. A report by CICIG («Informe», 2019) found that most coordinated accounts are localized in Guatemala City, Xela, and increasingly, Cobán. Each operation involves between fifteen and twenty people, who manage in total 100-200 fake accounts on Twitter and Facebook (Currier & Mackey, 2018; «Informe», 2019). Multiple accounts are also managed by different people («Informe», 2019), and they have a greater level of activity from Monday to Friday from 6 am to 6 pm. Employees are mostly university students, who receive between Q3.000 and Q4.000 per month (around $380-520) («Informe», 2019). These net centres are paid more than $280,000 for their services (Abbas et al., 2019), around $7,000 per month («Informe», 2019). Most specifically, for the full-time pro-candidate and attack campaigns during general elections in 2015, net centres asked for $375,000 (Currier & Mackey, 2018). As suggested by Assardo, “there were two big net center operations that 165