then, there have been multiple attacks on anti-corruption activists, CICIG officials, and opposition figures in general. Currier & Mackey (2018) suggested that a portion of the pro-government propaganda during Morales’ administration originated from within the government itself. This allegation was reinforced by the link established between a Twitter account under the pseudonym DictaLord and Marvin Palacios Castillo, who was closely connected with the political elite in Guatemala and had two contracts “related to social media monitoring” (Currier & Mackey, 2018). It has also been alleged that Elsie Sierra, news director at Channel 13, recruited people to work at net centres and connected them with the Secretary of Communication to the Presidency to manage pro-Morales social media accounts (Nómada, 2018). Additionally, Currier & Mackey (2018) highlight the involvement of business elites, comprised of former military figures, who invest in these campaigns. In line with this, the CICIG report («Informe», 2019) specified that the primary clients of these net centres are public servants, politicians, and members of the business community. However, no individual names were specified and, in spite of the state-aligned campaigns, the connections to the government are not clearly established. Although most journalists state that the level of activity of net centres have decreased since the 2019 general elections, “the infrastructure to attack journalists is still there” (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2020). Table 1: Organizational Guatemala Initial Government Report Agencies 2016 Evidence found Form and Prevalence of Social Media Manipulation in Politicians & Private Civil Society Citizens & Parties Contractors Organizations Influencers Evidence Evidence found Evidence found found Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. Strategies, Tools, and Techniques The report by the CICIG («Informe», 2019) provided evidence of the existence of individuals or companies that work to discredit, attack and disseminate disinformation, especially against anti-corruption activists, via social media, including such platforms as Facebook, Twitter, and the messaging app WhatsApp. Additionally, social media accounts and email accounts have been hacked or “communications intercepted” (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2020). Net centres make use of fake accounts to amplify pro-government messages and attacks on opposition. Moreover, opponents are not only subject to account hacking, online stalking, and image manipulation, but also direct intimidation and threats (Abbas et al., 2019). Forms of online harassment include the dissemination of memes and the labelling of targets as terrorists, leftists, foreign invaders, and more, reinforcing the polarized rhetoric of the civil war period. The 2019 Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights made special reference to the concerns that journalists were being targeted often with vocabulary associated with war, such as “enemies of the country” and “guerrilla”, as well as other militarized terminology (IACHR, 2020). 164