Strategies, Tools, and Techniques The Eritrean trolling activities predominantly take place on Facebook. The platform has removed hundreds of accounts associated with the UAE’s trolling activities, many of which were run by Eritrea’s task force. Where the trolls were not engaged with UAE’s work, they targeted Eritreans residing in foreign countries on Facebook and Twitter to disrupt any discussion that goes against the government’s narratives and intimidated and harassed individuals who, for example, report on the country for Eritrean newspapers located abroad (Awate, 2019; “Eritrea Unleashes Its Troll Patrol,” 2015). Additionally, Eritrea has been using its new knowledge to attack other governments online, mainly by spreading accusations and potential disinformation. For example, in 2018 the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea was opened for the first time since the two countries had been at war between 1998 and 2000. However, after only three months Eritrea closed it again and took to social media to accuse Ethiopia of plotting to disrupt Eritrean security by attempting to assassinate a high-ranking general with the goal of ultimately overthrowing the PFDJ’s rule. Eritrea may have had an ulterior motive to close the border and attack Ethiopia as observers note that public agitation with the Eritrean government is continuously increasing and many took advantage of the open border to leave the country (Gedab News, 2018). Domestically Eritrea is not experiencing much cyber troop activity, which, given the low internet penetration rates, is not too surprising. To ensure control over the information citizens acquire, the Eritrean administration relies instead on intimidation and surveillance: since October 2016 state security required internet cafés (which are basically the only internet service providers in the country) to keep a detailed log on all customers including those that would go online using their own devices at cafés (Carnegie Ethics Online Monthly Column, 2016; Harnet, 2016). Table 2: Observed Strategies, Tools and Techniques of Social Media Manipulation in Eritrea Account Types Messaging and Valence Content and Communication Platforms Strategies Human Pro-government Trolling Facebook Fake accounts Attacking opposition (critics Disinformation Twitter of country) Supressing speech Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. Organizational Capacity and Resources Given the poor domestic internet connectivity, most pro-regime trolling happens from outside of Eritrea by forces likely trained through the administration’s connections to the UAE, who are then sent abroad to get to work (Shearlaw, 2015). Even the Eritrean ambassador to Japan is alleged to be part of the task force trained by the UAE (Awate, 2019). There is not much known about what training Eritrean operatives receive from the UAE or how their training and operation is being paid for and how much resources the Eritrean government uses to attack activists living abroad. Nevertheless, their activities seem on-going and coordinated, though the possibility remains that much of the organization and coordination is done by the UAE. 133