Despite the fact that the 1947 constitution established a democratic form of governance, the Tatmadaw accepted civilian supremacy giving it the platform to continue gradually expanding its political influence (Bunte, 2017). Bunte continues: The outbreak of ethnic and communist rebellions after the departure of the British triggered the institutional modernization of the armed forces, which did not keep pace with the civilian government capacities of the nation state. (p. 13) By prioritizing the modernization of only the military, the Tatmadaw gave itself a significant leg up on the rest of the institutions of government in Burma. As a result, the Tatmadaw quickly increased its influence in all facets of Burmese society while preventing any real hope of civilian intervention. Since the Tatmadaw assumed such a prominent role, by the 1950s it had controlled much of the nation’s administrative and civilian functions and was able to secure a significant portion of the national budget, claiming it was necessary for internal security—a claim that was legitimized by the earlier ethnic and communist rebellions. Despite the clear dominance of the Tatmadaw, Burma remained under a federal structure and parliamentary democracy until Ne Win and the Revolutionary Council (RC) constructed and implemented the 1974 Socialist constitution. This resulted in the official power transfer from the RC to the BSPP. In reality this shift between dominating parties was merely a reorganization of bureaucratic positions within the existing government, once again displaying the military-state’s paranoia regarding its power position. Moreover the new constitution demarcated seven minority states and seven principally Burman divisions (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). The Burmese Way to Socialism was introduced under the 1974 constitution as the official state ideology and as a blueprint for 55