backed Buddhist organization, Ma Ha Na, banned MaBaTha from operating under its current name. Thereafter the group rebranded, now calling itself Buddha Dhamma Prahita Foundation; “This foundation is a Sangha [Buddhist clergy] organization, and we made the donation for the Sangha. The Tatmadaw will make donations to organizations which it thinks are necessary for our religion,” Brig-Gen. Zaw Min Tun told The Irrawaddy. (Zaw, 2019) By officially stepping back from absolute political power, the military freed itself from the confines of the democratic separation between church and state. To this day, this allows the military to openly and aggressively denounce any non-Buddhist aspects of Burmese society that do not conform to the needs or desires of individual generals. In openly supporting ultranationalist organizations and individuals, the military meddles with an already delicate and potentially explosive situation. MaBaTha monks, including the renowned U Wirathu, have given anti-Muslim sermons and were heavily involved in garnering support for Tatmadaw operations against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine state. Military support for this underscores the necessity of a Tatmadaw that is still politically and socially influential and adds legitimacy to its claim that only the military is able to secure peace and prosperity in Burma. The perceived threat raised by community organizations such as MaBaTha and the Tatmadaw was largely constructed by monks and societal figureheads who were strongly connected to the central government and/or generals in the military through the use of propaganda, censorship, and informants. Skidmore describes the Tatmadaw’s adoption of panoptic surveillance of the globalization of Southeast Asia by using communication, transportation, and construction as central elements of modernization ... Such changes have occurred alongside a transformation in the way of intelligence and “information” apparatus of the State 83