A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The exact reach of MaBaTha across all these domains, and the role of specific individuals serving it to spread hate speech, merit further careful examination. 1324. Several of the hate speech messages and disinformation from the 2012-2013 period were distributed with the involvement or tacit approval of government or security officials. The MaBaTha campaign around the protection of race and religion has led directly to the adoption of specific legislation affecting the Rohingya (for example, denial of voting rights and the Race and Religion Laws).2924 From public statements and appearances at public events, rallies and demonstrations, it is clear that a range of politicians (in particular in Rakhine State) and officials within the military and security forces are supportive of MaBaTha’s messages and proposed policies. There are also indications of closer links, including of financial donations, private and public sermons in support of the military’s operations, and the organization of public rallies and talks in support of the military. There are allegations of personal links between MaBaTha monks and high-level politicians and security forces commanders that warrant further examination. 1325. Whether the hate campaigns against Muslims and Rohingya have led or contributed to actual outbreaks of violence is difficult to establish. Several reports have suggested that outbreaks of violence have been preceded by visits or sermons of monks associated with the MaBaTha, the distribution of anti-Muslim pamphlets and/or increased hate speech on social media.2925 One example is the violence that broke out in Mandalay at the beginning of July 2014. It resulted in two deaths, many persons injured and significant property damage. It is believed that the violence was triggered by an online news report from 30 June 2014 in which it was alleged that two Muslim teashop owners had raped a Buddhist woman, identifying the teashop by name and including its location and the full names of the alleged perpetrators and the alleged victim. Wirathu reposted the article on his Facebook page with a caption stating that the “Mafia flame (of the Muslims) is spreading” and that “all Burmans must be ready”. Violence erupted the following day. The rape story turned out to be false, with the “victim” reportedly admitting that she had fabricated the rape allegations. 2926 In an effort to contain the violence in Mandalay, the government reportedly blocked access to Facebook in the city, acknowledging the role that the platform plays in this regard. 2927 The Chief of the Myanmar Police Force reportedly confirmed that the government blocked Facebook to stop the incitement.2928 1326. The Mission received information suggesting that the linkage between offline and online hate speech and real world acts of discrimination and violence is more than circumstantial. Patterns are emerging of hate speech sermons and rhetoric in specific locations that have subsequently experienced violence, and so are indications of peaks of online hate speech around outbreaks of violence. Such patterns and indications need to be comprehensively examined.2929 (c) Government and military mirroring and feeding the narrative 1327. The responsibility to address the proliferation of hate speech in the country and the coordinated campaigns of hatred directed at Muslims and Rohingya in particular lies with the government. The response in this regard has been wholly inadequate. In fact, the Myanmar authorities have not only condoned such practices, they have actively participated in and 2924 2925 2926 2927 2928 2929 See chapter V, section B.5: Restrictions affecting private life. E.g. Justice Trust Policy Report, Hidden Hands Behind Communal Violence in Myanmar: Case Study of the Mandalay Riots (March 2015); B-001. Z. Mann, “5 Accused of Sparking Mandalay Riots Sentenced to 21 Years Jail” (The Irrawaddy, 19 March 2015). T. McLaughlin, “How Facebook’s Rise Fueled Chaos and Confusion in Myanmar” (Wired, 6 July 2018). https://burma.irrawaddy.com/opinion/2014/07/04/61420.html; See also Thant Sin, “Who’s to blame for Myanmar’s spate of sectarian riots?” (Global Voices Online, 12 July 2014). With Facebook in the early stages of improving its transparency about country-specific data, the Mission has been unable to obtain comprehensive data from Facebook about the use of Facebook to spread hate speech and incite violence in Myanmar. See further below. 331