3. LITERATURE REVIEW 3.1 PROPAGANDA: THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGICAL PURPOSE OF FAKE NEWS The aims of fake news can be classified as ideological or financial. Some fake news is generated in order to make profit. In other cases, it is intended as political propaganda (BouMateen 2021, 213). Researchers have posited that by 2017 social media had turned into a hotbed of propaganda and misinformation in the Arab world (Schiffrin 2017, 117). That is why social media have been described as the “motor” of fake news (Mekawy 2021, 280). In Arab countries, propaganda takes many forms, according to the current affairs in each country. The most significant events that occurred in Arab countries in the last decade were mass protests and conflict between countries and among political groups within countries, all of which fuel the spread of fake news. FAKE NEWS AND MASS PROTESTS Some researchers have praised the role of social media in the Arab Spring: these media catalyzed political change, broke down the monopoly of traditional media, and provided room for marginalized opposition groups. However, scholars also recognize that social media are often exploited by authoritarian regimes to disseminate deception and rumors (Al Najjar 2021, 62). The mass protests in Algeria and Sudan have been used as examples in the literature. Fake news was spread during the Algerian protests in 2019. Facebook was utilized to activate the popular movement, but it was also abused by certain groups to mislead the public (BouMateen 2021, 216). Many accounts on social media posted fabricated photos about alleged clashes between protesters and the police. Also, deceptive photos of clans raising the French flag were disseminated on Facebook in an attempt to distort the people’s uprising (BouMateen 2021, 220). Sudan witnessed massive demonstrations in 2018 and 2019. Interviews carried out by Daffalla et al. (2020, 1) with thirteen Sudanese activists revealed that the activists were intimidated, arrested, and injured. At same time, the internet was blocked, followed by a flooding of fake news spread by fake accounts on Twitter to target activists. The activists interviewed attributed the misinformation I N FO R M ATI O N D I SO R D ER IN THE GLOBA L SOUTH to accounts sponsored by the overthrown regime. Although some activists disregard misinformation and consider it as a low-level threat compared to physical threats, others expressed a great fear of misinformation. For example, in Sudan fake accounts on social media misled people by identifying locations for protests where the police forces were waiting to detain protesters (Daffalla et al. 2020, 6). The danger of misinformation is not limited to countries where censorship is in force, such as Sudan and Algeria, but also exists in Tunisia, which has been ranked 73rd in the World Press Freedom Index (RSF 2021b). It has been described as a “free” country by Freedom House (Freedom House 2020). However, the scale of fake news and hate speech in Tunisia expanded during the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019. In Tunisia, the conditions differ from Sudan and Algeria, as Tunisian activists have not been targeted by fake news themselves. They monitor social media for fake news, especially Facebook, which tops the list of most popular social media platforms, with 66 percent of Tunisians having accounts. As Facebook partnered with only one third-party fact checker in Arab states—compared to seven in the USA—political campaigns in Tunisia were launched on Facebook by undeclared parties without official support. This motivated activists to take over the role of fact checking; however, civil society faces obstacles in monitoring the flood of fake news and rumors on social media (Elswah & Howard 2020, 1). Researchers who have studied the phenomenon of fake news in Tunisia and Sudan observe that even though Sudanese and Tunisian activists lacked technological expertise, they tried to verify news on social media in an attempt to help stop the flood of disinformation in both countries. In Sudan, Dafalla et al. (2020) note that the Facebook page of the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA) was a reliable source of firsthand information. Sudanese activists also created a multi-layered network of contacts to provide the audience with verified information. However, they did not utilize sophisticated tools, such as Facebook’s info button, to trace fake accounts; instead, they tracked them manually through checking the profiles (Daffalla et al. 2020, 6). In Tunisia, only three civil society organizations were financially equipped to initiate projects to detect fake news on social media, namely I Watch, Middle East and North Africa – 63