Freedom House Controlling information to tilt an election M any governments sought to control electoral outcomes while still claiming the political legitimacy that only a free and fair election can confer. Their curation of the online information space through censorship and content manipulation often reinforced offline efforts to plant seeds of doubt in or rig the voting itself. For example, a number of incumbents restricted access to content about the opposition, reducing their opponents’ ability to persuade and mobilize voters, or simply boosted their own preferred narratives about the election results. Censorship and content manipulation frequently began well before an electoral period, disrupting the crucial discussion and debate necessary for voters to form and express their views. Obstruction of access to diverse information In 25 of the 41 FOTN countries that held or prepared for nationwide elections during the coverage period, governments blocked websites hosting political, social, and religious speech; restricted access to social media platforms; or cut off internet connectivity altogether. Blocking websites, the most common form of election-related censorship, allowed authorities to selectively restrict content that they deemed objectionable, such as reporting on corruption or evidence of voting irregularities, while maintaining access to information that worked in their favor. Internet shutdowns were the least common election-related censorship tactic, suggesting that authorities are more reluctant to impose such extreme and unpopular restrictions during balloting. When they did occur, shutdowns were most often aimed at reducing opposition parties’ ability to communicate with voters ahead of an election or to quash postelection protests over alleged fraud. Technical censorship limits independent information and reduces electoral competition Technical censorship was often used to suppress access to independent reporting, criticism of the government, and civil @freedomhouse society websites, mirroring a given state’s broader offline restrictions over news media. Officials in Cambodia ordered internet service providers to block access to independent news websites a week before the July 2023 elections, further tightening media controls during a balloting process that was thoroughly engineered to suppress challenges to the ruling Cambodian People’s Party. Governments also deployed technical censorship to stymie the opposition’s ability to engage with voters. Ahead of Bangladesh’s January 2024 elections, authorities temporarily restricted internet connectivity when the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) held a large rally in October 2023, limiting online discussion of the event and impeding the party’s digital outreach to supporters. In the run-up to Belarus’s openly rigged parliamentary elections, in February 2024, officials partially restricted access to YouTube to prevent Belarusians from watching exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s New Year address. To mock the government’s own information controls, however, the Belarusian opposition created Yas Gaspadar, a made-up candidate generated by AI, claiming that he could speak freely to voters online without risking arrest. Repressive regimes that faced strong opposition challengers resorted to the most brazen forms of censorship in their bids to maintain power. During Pakistan’s February 2024 general elections, the military used harsh offline methods to suppress support for former prime minister Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, imprisoning Khan and other party leaders, barring Khan from running, and forcing Repressive regimes that faced strong opposition challengers resorted to the most brazen forms of censorship in their bids to maintain power. freedomhouse.org 7