April 2020] THE "WEAPONIZATION" OF FACEBOOK 825 ramifications of corporate criminal liability under international law.87 Simply put, “there was too little time.”88 Nevertheless, scholars continue to theorize the contours of corporate criminal liability. Expanding on the theory of complicity, Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, two leading scholars on corporate criminal complicity, suggest: “[A] corporation [can] . . . be directly complicit in human rights abuses where it decides to participate through assistance of the commission of human rights abuses and that assistance contributes to the commission of the human rights abuses by another.”89 International courts and tribunals have required two elements to establish complicity in international criminal law: mens rea and actus reus.90 Scholars have debated whether the mens rea element requires knowledge or purpose.91 In other words, the debate focuses on “whether the aider and abettor need merely have knowledge that her actions will facilitate the commission of the crime, or whether she must harbor a purpose to facilitate the crime.”92 Under, Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Statute, an individual is criminally responsible if he or she acted criminally “[f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission.”93 The Second Circuit in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. interpreted this statute literally. To prove corporate complicity in the United States under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which relies on international law, the victim must establish that the corporation “intended to assist or encourage the commission of the principal offense.”94 After much debate on the standard of corporate complicity, the Talisman Energy, Inc. court held that “the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability in ATS actions is purpose rather than knowledge alone.”95 Interpreting the Article 25(3)(c) literally, the Talisman Energy court set the standard for corporate legal liability as “purposefully aiding and abetting” and relied on international criminal law, namely the Nuremberg Trials and the Rome Statute.96 While the statute explicitly includes the word “purpose” in defining intent, courts and tribunals have held that the mens rea standard requires an officer or director to have knowledge that the principal actor intended the human rights 87. Id. 88. Id. 89. Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 346 (2001). 90. Id. 91. Cassel, supra note 68, at 307–13. 92. Id. at 308. 93. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544,. 94. Jonathan Clough, Punishing the Parent: Corporate Criminal Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 899, 910–11 (2008); see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 268 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring). 95. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009). 96. See id.