824 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:813 foster.”79 If corporations are afforded the same constitutional protections as individuals because of their active participation in society, then corporations should also be subject to the ramifications of their actions as fully recognized entities within the legal system.80 Additionally, scholars like Ronald Slye, Associate Professor at the Seattle University School of Law, argue that the corporate entity should be liable for the gravest human rights abuses based on a parallel theory that finds sovereign states, rather than individuals, liable for international human rights abuses.81 When discussing grave international human rights abuses by corporations, corporate criminal liability serves an important function—to provide relief to victims of these human rights violations and to deter future human rights violations.82 B. STANDARD FOR CORPORATE COMPLICITY “[T]he Rome Statute, which created the International Criminal Court (ICC),” serves as the primary source of law for international criminal law and defines major human rights abuses including “war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression.”83 Under the Rome Statute, an individual may be held criminally liable for “committing, planning, ordering, or instigating a crime or for otherwise aiding and abetting a crime.”84 Although the Rome Statute does not currently extend to corporations, a growing trend towards recognizing corporate liability on a domestic level raises convincing reasons to reconsider the jurisdictional scope of the Rome Statute.85 David Scheffer explains: [A]t that time, there were an insufficient number of national jurisdictions that held corporations liable under criminal law, as opposed to civil tort liability, which has long been universal. The principle of complementarity under the Rome Statute, a principle dependent on compatible criminal law in state party jurisdictions, would have been crippled as a consequence.86 Considering the interplay between domestic and international laws on corporate liability, drafters of the Rome Statute were unable to fully consider the 79. Id. at 343 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). 80. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL75700, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL LAW 13–20 (2013). 81. See Slye, supra note 65. 82. Id. at 957. 83. Aparac, supra note 73, at 40. 84. See INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 18, at 11 (footnotes omitted); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on its Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/1316, at 377–78 (1950) (“Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law.”). 85. See Scheffer, supra note 14. 86. Id. at 38 (footnote omitted).