Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield Crisis Group Asia Report N°314, 18 May 2021 Page 23 troduced stricter controls on what its personnel can say and do on social media; soldiers are unlikely to post videos of themselves with their weapons without permission.110 TikTok says it has been “aggressively” looking for signs of coordination but has thus far detected it on only a limited scale.111 As with other platforms, TikTok has seen user behaviour adapt in response to stricter enforcement. Threats of violence and misinformation have become subtler; instead of threatening a protester with a gun, a user might make a shooting motion with their fingers or, for example, a veiled threat in the form of a warning.112 For all platforms, this adaptive behaviour underscores the importance of constant monitoring, hiring adequate numbers of native speakers as moderators and building partnerships with local organisations. At the same time as social media platforms have diminished the military’s ability to communicate, its opponents have ramped up campaigns against the regime. While Facebook remains popular, particularly for sharing information in Myanmar language with other users inside the country and with the large diaspora, many political figures and ordinary social media users have adopted new platforms in order to reach new audiences. Twitter, in particular, has witnessed an explosion of users from Myanmar since 1 February, in part because it is widely perceived as the most effective platform for sharing information – particularly military abuses – with the outside world.113 D. A Strategic Dilemma Although the military’s immediate focus is on consolidating control over the country, and it appears willing to take whatever steps are necessary to do so, the online space does present it with a longer-term problem. Maintaining an internet blackout for an extended period of time will not only impede a well-functioning economy and society, and isolate Myanmar from the rest of the world, but also impair government operations, and prevent the military from communicating with its supporters through social media. It will also damage its standing domestically and internationally, undermining further its narrative that opposition to military rule is less significant than it appears. Yet any relaxation of internet restrictions is likely to reinvigorate protests, enabling activists to once again mobilise more readily. Controlling the internet at a national scale was a challenge for which the Tatmadaw was largely unprepared. It did not expect to face such wide-scale or sustained opposition to its power grab. It has quickly realised that it is not set up to win the fight 110 Crisis Group interviews, social media and conflict researchers, March 2021. Crisis Group interview, TikTok representative, May 2021. 112 Another subtle example of misinformation is the use of the gold emoji to push the narrative that the NLD leadership is corrupt, as the Tatmadaw has alleged that Aung San Suu Kyi received gold as a bribe. Crisis Group interview, TikTok representative, May 2021. 113 Analysis of popular coup-related hashtags in early February found almost half of users had set up their accounts in 2021, while Statista recorded a six-fold increase in Twitter users in Myanmar from December 2020 to March 2021. Many Myanmar Twitter users new to the platform simply retweet posts with long lists of hashtags in an effort to bring it to the attention of international organisations, journalists and high-profile individuals. For further discussion on Twitter uptake, see “Twitter and SMS: Myanmar’s new frontiers of fear”, Frontier Myanmar, 24 February 2021; and “The battle for Myanmar plays out on Twitter, TikTok and Telegram”, op. cit. 111