websites of opposition political parties, critical political content, and independent news sites previously found to be blocked were found to be accessible during 2012 testing. 245 More recently, as the ICT sector has developed and more international services are available, these services are beginning to track and report on requests from the Government of Myanmar. The social networking site Facebook noted in its Government Requests Report that, in the period July-December 2014, the company restricted access to 5 pieces of content reported by the President’s Office based on sections 295(A), 298, 504, and 505 of the Myanmar Penal Code, which covers "Acts or words which intentionally cause outrage or wound religious feelings" and "Statements or insults which intentionally provokes a breach of the peace or causes public mischief." 246 (See Chapter 4.2 on Hate Speech). Network Shutdowns Fulfilment of the right to access information also relies on the availability of telecommunications services, including mobile services and the Internet. Clause 77 of the Telecommunications Law grants MCIT the ability to “temporarily suspend a telecommunication service, stop or prohibit any type of communication or use of telecommunication services” when doing so would be “for the benefit of the people”. 247 The lack of a clear legal framework puts mobile operators, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) at substantial risk of being ordered to shutdown networks or services without clear legal justification, impacting their responsibility to respect human rights such as freedom of expression. 248 Network shutdowns are regularly used by governments worldwide to stifle free expression by cutting off the means of delivering a message. 249 As more and more people become connected and rely on mobile and Internet services in their day-to-day lives, Governmentordered network and service disruption become increasingly disruptive and dangerous (see Table 36). Blocking of services during protests also impacts freedom of association, and often precedes further human rights violations. Myanmar experienced a major Internet disconnection during the Saffron Revolution. In August 2007, protests grew throughout the country in a response to deteriorating economic conditions and political discontent. ICTs facilitated the flow of information from citizen journalists to media outlets around the world. 250 In an attempt to prevent information reaching media outside of Myanmar, particularly regarding police brutality and 245 Open Network Initiative “Update On information Controls in Burma (23 October 2012). Facebook “Government Requests Report: Myananmar July 2014-December 2014“ (accessed Aug 2015). 247 Myanmar Telecommunications Law, Clause 77. 248 IHRB, “Network Shutdowns in the DRC: ICT companies need clear rules” (19 Feb 2015). 249 In 2013 and 2014 alone, Freedom House reported network disconnections, that were likely governmentordered, in Ethiopia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Syria, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Yemen and Zimbabwe. See Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net“ (2014). In Jan 2015, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo ordered a near country-wide mobile network shutdown following protests over the President’s unconstitutional decision to remain in power for a third term. In May 2015 in Burundi, following similar protests over the President’s plan to seek another term, the government blocked access to Facebook, Twitter, Viber and WhatsApp. See IHRB, “Network Shutdowns in the DRC: ICT companies need clear rules” (19 Feb 2015). 250 For further analysis see: Berkman Centre for Internet and Society, “The Role of the Internet in Burma’s Saffron Revolution” (28 September 2008). 246 CHAPTER 4.1: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 127 4 4.1