CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS During the historical protests, the government restricted what the Burmese media could report on. A similar censorship has emerged within recent months as the military coup has been underway in Myanmar. On February 2, 2021, the second day of the coup, one of Facebook’s directors of public policy in the Asia-Pacific region stated that the company would be taking proactive actions to moderate content posted on Facebook in Myanmar in an effort to curb hate speech and misinformation, with one of their first actions being the removal of a page for Myanmar’s Myawaddy Television Network, which posted photos to promote Myanmar’s military efforts. Furthermore, on February 25, 2021, Facebook announced that they were banning all “Tatmadaw-linked commercial entities” from advertising on its platforms, as well as any pages linked to the military, its units, and any other organizations that are under direct military control, such as army-controlled media, and the Ministries of Home, Defence, and Border Affairs. On March 4, 2021, YouTube also announced that it had removed 5 channels that were found to have been hosted by military-affiliated television networks. This operation is similar to the measures implemented by Facebook in 2018 after the killings of the Rohingya minorities were reported in Myanmar. At that time, Facebook removed over 400 Facebook pages, 17 groups, and 135 accounts, as well as 15 Instagram accounts, for engaging in coordinated inauthentic behavior, with many of the pages having been operated by, or closely affiliated with, the Myanmar military — including the Facebook account of then-Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, commander of the current military junta. On February 4, 2021, it was reported that internet providers operating in Myanmar were told to block access to Facebook and Facebook-owned services such as WhatsApp from February 4 to 7, 2021. The military claimed the block of the social media platforms was to decrease the amount of disinformation and misinformation surrounding its actions; however, critics of the putsch have theorized that the real reason was to prevent pro-democracy movements and protests. Historical Censorship According to a report produced by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), the state of internet censorship in Myanmar has historically been restrictive and there have been several attempts by Myanmar’s government to limit online speech. For instance, there have been reports of the government historically using spyware to target activists, dissidents, journalists, and human rights advocates. These spyware variants include the FinSpy spyware, Pegasus Spyware, and the Unlimited Interception System (ULIN) created by the Tel Aviv-based spyware firm Ability, which allows users to intercept GSM, UMTS, LTE, and CDMA networks. 5 On March ,2021 ,1 The New York Times reported that the Myanmar military had once again increased their arsenal of surveillance equipment ,which included Israeli-made surveillance drones ,iPhone cracking devices ,Swedish forensic data tools, and American software that could compromise computer systems and exfiltrate content .The advocacy group ,Justice for Myanmar ,was able to obtain government budgets for the last 2 years ,which included tens of millions of dollars allocated for technologies that could allow the military to mine phones, track live locations ,and listen to conversations. The country’s censorship activities also include several cybersecurity laws that restrict what users can access, say, and do within the country. These laws are vaguely worded and open to a broad interpretation, allowing the government to freely set and change the parameters for these laws. For example, Section 66D of the 2013 Telecommunications Law prohibits users from the “extortion, coercion, wrongful restraint, defamation, undue influence or threatening of any person” while using telecommunication networks within the country. Additionally, the Myanmar Penal Code contains several subsections, notably Sections 124A, 505B and 499-502, that prohibit content that could “bring into hatred, contempt, attempts to excite, or disaffection towards the government”, “the creation, publication, or circulation of any statement or rumor with the intent to cause fear or alarm to the public which may induce them to commit an offense against the State or against public tranquility”, and “allows the State to prosecute an individual for defamation”, respectively. Prominent Social Media in Myanmar Social media use has exploded in Myanmar in the last decade, particularly with the use of Facebook and affiliated applications, such as Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, and Instagram, with estimates that approximately 50% of individuals in Myanmar are active on Facebook. The rise of social media is coupled with the fact that Myanmar has a younger population, with the median age being 28.2 in 2021 in a population of approximately 54 million. The younger generation is more actively involved in politics, from organizing pro-democracy movements on social media to spreading news of the situation in Myanmar internationally. Prior to the shutdown of applications such as Instagram, social media “influencers” had also taken a stand against the military coup and shared content to their millions of followers regarding the situation within the country. CTA-2021-0324 Recorded Future ® | www.recordedfuture.com