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21 Unequal Access to Disaster Recovery After the earthquake, junta-run media reported officials and technical personnel working at Buddhist religious and heritage sites. The junta-run Ministry of Information also announced National Disaster Management Fund allocations for cleaning and rehabilitation in earthquake-affected areas, including renovation of pagodas, stupas and temples, historic buildings, religious buildings, and other seriously damaged buildings.63 During the same period, BHRN documented uncleared debris at mosque sites while Muslim communities were still seeking permission from junta-controlled offices to demolish damaged structures and rebuild mosques.64 On July 5, 2025, junta-run media reported Lieutenant General Thet Pone inspecting reconstruction and renovation at Shinpin Nann Oo Pagoda in Sagaing and Lieutenant General Soe Tint Naing inspecting Maha Muni Pagoda in Mandalay, where officials coordinated measures for restoration.65 BHRN also documented emergency assistance from junta-run institutions reaching some Muslim earthquake survivors. A community member in Sagaing told BHRN that assistance provided 300,000 kyats for each person killed and 50,000 kyats for each injured person. A community member of another mosque said many displaced families were sleeping outside in the heat and lacked basic items such as adequate mats, mosquito nets, and pillows. He said relief distributions focused largely on food, drinking water, and similar supplies, while injured people and others unable to reach ward distribution points could miss assistance before supplies ran out.66 Other mosque communities described receiving no assistance from junta-run institutions for mosque recovery. A witness at Ko Yan Taw Mosque said on 13 April 2025 that the community had received no such assistance or donations and was relying on its own efforts.67At Kala Pyo Mosque, a small congregation was carrying out demolition and debris clearance through volunteer labour and preparing a temporary prayer space after the mosque was destroyed.68The community member in Nauk Taw Par similarly said no assistance from junta-run institutions had been provided there by the date of interview.69 September 2026 interviews showed that permission to rebuild did not bring reconstruction assistance. Trustees in Mandalay said they had received no financial support from junta-run institutions for mosque reconstruction and were relying on mosque communities, private donors, or other non-governmental assistance.70 At a mosque in Bago Region, a community member said, “We haven't received anything from the government. We have had to handle everything ourselves from beginning to end.”71 Some Muslim earthquake survivors did receive emergency cash or relief 63 The Mirror, 6 July 2025, p. 15. Ministry of Information, “Rescue & reconstruction efforts ongoing in quake-affected areas in Sagaing, Mandalay,” 27 April 2025. Ministry of Information, “Disaster fund deployed for quake recovery efforts,” 29 April 2025. Ministry of Information, “Restoration planned for 1,700+ quake-destroyed heritage sites in Mandalay,” 16 May 2025. 64 BHRN Interview 10, Myanmar, 13 May 2025. BHRN Interview 12, Myanmar, 15 June 2025. 65 The Mirror, 6 July 2025, p. 15. 66 BHRN Interview 2, Myanmar, 1 April 2025. BHRN Interview 3, Myanmar, 1 April 2025. 67 BHRN Interview 5, Myanmar, 13 April 2025. 68 BHRN Interview 6, Myanmar, 13 April 2025. 69 BHRN Interview 9, Myanmar, 13 April 2025. 70 BHRN Interview 15, Myanmar, 13 September 2026. BHRN Interview 16, Myanmar, 13 September 2026. BHRN Interview 17, Myanmar, 13 September 2026. 71 BHRN Interview 18, Myanmar, 15 September 2026.

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Blocked From Rebuilding: Myanmar Junta Restrictions on Mosque Repair and Reconstruction

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Language

English

Topic

Earthquake
Military Coup
Rohingya Crisis

Author(s)

Burma Human Rights Network

Date Published: Oct 7, 2026

Abstract: On March 28, 2025, a magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck central Myanmar as Muslims gathered for Friday prayers, killing large numbers of worshippers and damaging or destroying mosques. BHRN documented at least 180 earthquake-affected mosques and other Islamic religious buildings in 29 townships across Mandalay Region, Sagaing Region, Naypyidaw Union Territory, Bago Region, and southern Shan State, and at least 670 deaths among Muslims when mosques and other Islamic religious buildings collapsed. This report documents how decades of restrictions on mosque construction, repair, and renovation prevented or deterred some Muslim communities from addressing known structural risks before the disaster and continued to obstruct demolition, repair, and reconstruction afterward. Before the earthquake, Muslim communities faced years-long delays and unclear approval procedures for major repairs and structural work. Some communities repeatedly sought permission without receiving a formal permit. At one Mandalay mosque, an engineer identified cracks in supporting pillars beneath an excessively heavy roof, but the trustee feared that a formal application would create further problems over the mosque’s land and ownership. The community carried out the urgent work discreetly while watching for police and municipal officials. Other interviewees described leaking roofs, weakened pillars, deteriorating brickwork, and other repairs that could not be completed through a clear and predictable process. After the earthquake, the Myanmar military junta continued to restrict the demolition, repair, and reconstruction of damaged mosques. BHRN documented communities waiting for permission to demolish unsafe structures, clear damaged sites, repair buildings, or rebuild destroyed mosques. In Bone Oh Village, none of the damaged mosques had received demolition permission three months after the earthquake. By September 2026, some applications had advanced, but many remained unresolved. One Mandalay trustee said that more than 70 mosques had submitted applications, while only four had received repair permission and Panthay Mosque was the only mosque he knew to have received permission to rebuild from scratch. In Bago Region, a mosque received a demolition order two months after the earthquake but later obtained a construction permit. Some communities were still using temporary prayer spaces more than a year after the earthquake. BHRN found no clear, uniform legal framework governing mosque repair and reconstruction. Instead, communities described a system shaped by differing local requirements, official discretion, and informal practices. Lawyers, mosque trustees, and construction professionals said applications could pass through religious-affairs offices, municipal departments, land offices, the General Administration Department, and other junta-controlled offices, with requirements varying by location. One trustee who obtained approval said personal relationships and local influence were important and that mosques without such connections faced considerable difficulties. BHRN also documented allegations of payments connected to mosque repair and construction, although the available evidence did not establish whether every payment was an official fee or an unofficial payment. Land and documentation requirements created further barriers. Some longstanding mosque compounds lack the ownership or land-registration documents demanded during permit processes because they pre-date current registration systems. BHRN found that recognised religious-land status did not guarantee reconstruction permission, while communities without that status could be required to obtain land documents before a building application would be considered. The requirements varied between locations, leaving Muslim communities without a consistent route to repair or rebuild their places of worship. The restrictions documented in this report interfere with the right to freedom of religion or belief, including the ability of Muslim communities to establish, maintain, and use places of worship. Restrictions imposed because a site is Muslim, or applied more restrictively to Muslim places of worship than to comparable religious sites without objective and reasonable justification, constitute religious discrimination. The earthquake triggered the collapses, but BHRN documented how discriminatory restrictions prevented or deterred some Muslim communities from addressing known structural risks before the disaster and delayed work needed to make damaged sites safe afterward. Governments, ASEAN, the European Union, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, donors, and United Nations agencies should support affected Muslim communities through independent and locally led channels, strengthen targeted measures against those responsible for serious human rights violations, and support international and domestic accountability efforts. Assistance should not strengthen junta-controlled institutions or force affected communities to rely on discriminatory administrative systems where alternative channels are available.

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Blocked From Rebuilding: Myanmar Junta Restrictions on Mosque Repair and Reconstruction

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