12/16/25, 10:44 AM Beyond Ballots: The Junta Chief’s Elite Management Strategy Ahead of Myanmar’s Elections | ISP-Myanmar unta chief has also rewarded trusted figures with lucrative civilian positions, such as General Nyo Saw’s appointment (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/junta-boss-advisor-faceshopeless-task-solving-myanmars-economic-crisis.html) as Head of the Foreign Exchange Supervision Committee (FESC) in 2024 and General Mya Tun Oo’s appointment (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-strips-general-of-key-postsamid-corruption-probe.html) to the Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) in 2023. The sticks, by contrast, include forced retirements, demotions, imprisonment, and purges that extend beyond individuals to entire patron-client networks. Recent cases include the imprisonment (https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/42323/) of Lieutenant General Moe Myint Tun, once seen as Min Aung Hlaing’s likely successor, along with Lieutenant General Soe Htut and Brigadier General Yan Naung Soe, all charged with corruption. These actions mirror the sweeping purges under previous regimes, where the removal of a single senior figure often meant the downfall of their entire faction. There is historical precedent (https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/will-myanmars-brutal-military-remainunited.html) for this as well. For example, in the 1977 Ohn Kyaw Myint affair, a coup plot led to the young captain’s execution and the imprisonment of high-ranking officers such as General Tin Oo. Similarly, the 2004 purge of General Khin Nyunt and his entire intelligence apparatus demonstrates the enduring pattern of collective punishment. Under the current junta chief, this blend of economic co-optation and network-based purges reinforces a system in which loyalty and fear remain the twin pillars of regime stability. ​ Min Aung Hlaing’s Approach to Elite Management​ Following historical precedents, the current junta chief has similarly employed elite management to secure loyalty and consolidate control. Instead of allowing senior officers to ​ fade into retirement or risk alienation, the junta chief has been rewarding them with political incentives such as ministerial posts and electoral candidacies. In the months leading up to the elections, he removed (https://ispmyanmar.com/fu-01/) at least five generals, seven lieutenant generals, and 10 major generals from their positions, many of whom were wellregarded within the military and part of his winning coalition. Then he rewarded those retired officers with political incentives ahead of the upcoming general elections. Among them, General Nyo Saw (DSA-23), the former Quartermaster General and a close adviser to the junta chief, was rewarded with the position of Prime Minister. Similarly, General Mya Tun Oo (DSA-25), who was once seen as a potential successor to the junta chief and had served in both combat and intelligence commands, cultivating an extensive network (https://naingminkhant.substack.com/p/nay-pyi-taws-chaos-unraveling-the) of loyal subordinates, has now been positioned (https://www.dvb.no/post/729376)as a Pyithu Hluttaw candidate for Pyi Oo Lwin Township. https://ispmyanmar.com/beyond-ballots-the-junta-chiefs-elite-management-strategy-ahead-of-myanmars-elections/ 4/9