answers pre-arranged questions and highlights his “experience” and “service to the nation.” However, many of the accounts engaging with his content were reportedly newly created, suggesting a coordinated network of inauthentic accounts247. In Myanmar, observers have documented coordinated social media campaigns favoring the military over the years. Following Facebook’s 2018 ban on military-affiliated accounts, the military shifted to other social media platforms to disseminate propaganda and disinformation248. Pro-military social media accounts have also harassed and doxed those considered to be on the opposite side, leading to their arrests. In 2025, Myanmar Now reported a pro-military coordinated campaign on Facebook249. According to the report, the tactics used involved organized “comment campaigns” to influence public opinion. Fake accounts reportedly flooded posts critical of the military with comments, specifically targeting the channels of independent media outlets, including Myanmar Now, The Irrawaddy, and Mizzima250. The Myanmar Internet Project also reported in 2025 that TikTok has become a favored platform for spreading military propaganda251. This platform has likewise been used for election campaigns by pro-military figures in the sham election. As of early 2025, TikTok reportedly had 19.6 million users in Myanmar252. Following the 2021 coup, the military intensified its crackdown on independent media to dominate the information space with its propaganda. This led to a shrinking supply of factual reporting that could counter pro-military narratives, while pro-junta media thrived in the tightly controlled environment. In October 2025, ahead of the 47th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, pro-junta media and Telegram channels claimed that Min Aung Hlaing would attend the summit after Malaysian outlet New Straits Times listed his name among attendees. It was later confirmed that the junta leader had not been invited253. Ibid. “Removing Myanmar Military Officials From Facebook.” Meta, 28 Aug. 2018, about.fb.com/news/2018/08/ removing-myanmar-officials. 249. Sa Tun Aung. “Exclusive: Myanmar Regime Using Facebook Comments to Spread Disinformation.” Myanmar Now, 23 Aug. 2025, myanmar-now.org/en/news/exclusive-myanmar-regime-usingfacebook-comments-to-spread-disinformation. 250. Ibid. 251. “Weaponizing TikTok in Myanmar.” Myanmar Internet Project, 23 Aug. 2025, www.myanmarinternet.info/ post/weaponizing_tiktok_in_myanmar. 252. Kemp, Simon. “Digital 2025: Myanmar.” DataReportal, 3 Mar. 2025, datareportal.com/reports/ digital-2025-myanmar. 253. “ASEAN Leaders, Global Reps to Attend 47th ASEAN Summit – PM Anwar.” Bernama, 23 Oct. 2025, www.bernama.com/en/news.php?id=2481933. 247. 248. 57