For example, state-affiliated cybertroopers or trolls can amplify their narratives through paid advertisements, as social media platforms often overlook how such narratives can be disseminated as sponsored content. The blue checkmark on X (formerly Twitter)—once used to verify the authenticity of an account—can now be purchased, enabling bad actors to spread disinformation under the guise of credibility. In addition, social media algorithms can trap users in echo chambers that reinforce their existing beliefs and make them more susceptible to political propaganda. These issues warrant further examination, as they underscore that platform accountability is crucial to protecting human rights and upholding democratic values. Although advocacy directed at governments across many countries in the region, as well as at social media platforms, can be particularly challenging, other avenues remain available, including documentation, capacity building, and strategic litigation. In terms of digital security, as threats become more sophisticated, those at risk must be better equipped to respond to these challenges. The growing influence of the telecommunications sectors in Indonesia and Vietnam requires further documentation, particularly regarding their impact on human rights and democracy. In Cambodia, it is crucial to monitor whether the regime will resurrect the NIG and how it intends to implement it. In Myanmar, which has effectively become a surveillance state, documentation must continue, and opportunities for capacity building among vulnerable groups can be further explored. While 2025 has seen a trend of increasing state influence over telecommunications sectors, other digital threats have long been documented across Southeast Asia. The abuse of spyware, for example, has been recorded in Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam. In 2025, Singapore was named among the countries linked to the use of Graphite spyware, produced by the Israeli company Paragon Solutions71, adding to the already worrying situation involving other surveillance technologies documented earlier72. In Thailand, leaked documents about information operations (IO) in March 2025 revealed that cyber armies are learning tactics to attack political targets using brute-force attacks and evil twin attacks73. These types of attacks allow perpetrators to gain access to information in the accounts of targeted individuals. These developments compound Marczak, Bill, et al. “Virtue or Vice? A First Look at Paragon’s Proliferating Spyware Operations.” The Citizen Lab, 19 Mar. 2025, citizenlab.ca/research/a-first-look-at-paragons-proliferating-spyware-operations. 72. Loon, Yee. “Exposé Reveals Israeli Spyware Firm’s Mysterious Singapore Project Dating Back to 2018.” Gutzy Asia, 15 Dec. 2023, gutzy.asia/2023/12/15/expose-reveals-israeli-spyware-firms-mysterioussingapore-project-dating-back-to-2018. 73. The leaked documents, presented in Parliament on March 25, 2025, can be found at https://drive.google. com/drive/folders/16n2xNG_NvlcEM52vW9uPlpi7bsfVUJ5q. 71. 22