In the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte’s arrest by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in March 2025 for his war on drugs—when he was Mayor of Davao and later President of the Philippines—became a key narrative shaping the 2025 midterm elections 5, 6. A major development in the midterm elections is the spread of disinformation in the form of AI-generated content. Since Singapore held its 2025 general election in May, opposition members have been targeted with various online tactics, including bots and fake accounts—a situation that was not documented in previous elections7. In Thailand, the opposition political party revealed in March that the military-led information operations (IO) have become more sophisticated89. Although the military had never officially admitted this before—despite the operations being exposed since 2020—a court ruling in October 2025 proved that official documents submitted as evidence in the lawsuit against the military included details of the operations’ instructions, confirming their authenticity10. An investigation by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) also confirms the existence of the network11. Regarding Vietnam, Force 47 and Steering Committee 35 continue to operate in support of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s (CPV) interests. Force 47 is a military-run cyber unit first unveiled in 2017, while Steering Committee 35 is composed of CPV members. Both are tasked with protecting the CPV’s ideological foundations and combating “wrongful and hostile views” against the Party. In 2025, both groups incoporated AI-related issues into their strategies to protect the CPV’s political interests. The Vietnamese government also launched programs in 2025 to incentivize online influencers to shape public narratives in favor of the CPV12. “Duterte Case: The Prosecutor vs. Rodrigo Roa Duterte.” International Criminal Court, www.icc-cpi.int/philippines/duterte. 6. “Information Disorders in the Philippine Elections Getting More Complex.” DigitalReach, 30 June 2025, digitalreach.asia/news/analysis/information-disorders-in-the-philippine-elections-getting-more-complex. 7. “Digital Tactics to Undermine Opposition Parties in the 2025 Singapore Election.” DigitalReach, 18 May, 2025, digitalreach.asia/news/analysis/digital-tactics-to-undermine-opposition-parties-in-the-2025singapore-election. 8. “Chayaphon Unveils IO Operations: Escalating Targeting of Dissenters and Key Government Figures Through Fabricated Claims.” The Standard, 25 Mar. 2025, thestandard.co/no-confidence-debate-2568-43. 9. “Opposition Accuses Paethongtarn Government of Allowing Military to Conduct IO Operations—Revealing 46 Target Names That Have Been “Lock On.”” BBC News Thai, 25 Mar. 2025, www.bbc.com/thai/articles/ c20lw5qx4z1o. 10. “The Administrative Court in Thailand Dismissed a Lawsuit Regarding the State-Linked Information Operations.” DigitalReach, 2 Nov. 2025, digitalreach.asia/news/the-administrative-court-in-thailanddismissed-a-lawsuit-regarding-the-state-linked-information-operation. 11. “Thai Military Uses Information Operations Against Political Dissidents, NHRC Finds.” Prachatai English, 28 Oct. 2025, prachataienglish.com/node/11631. 12. “Is Tran Thanh Really ‘Tone-Deaf’, ‘Out of Tune’, or ‘Dangerous.’?” BBC News Tiếng Việt, 7 Sep. 2025, www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/c0lkpzz002xo. 5. 12