In May 2025, Myanmar Now and Finance Uncovered also published a joint investigation revealing that Frontiir, an internet service provider in Myanmar, had installed intercept technology from Geedge Network257. According to the investigation, this technology enabled Frontiir to assist the military by tracking individuals online, blocking websites, and preventing users from accessing VPNs. Following the 2021 coup, telecommunications and internet service providers in Myanmar were ordered to install intercept technology to allow the army to eavesdrop on citizens’ communications258. Justice For Myanmar reported that technology from Geedge Network was deployed with the cooperation of telecommunications companies and related service providers in the country, including ATOM (formerly Telenor Myanmar), Mytel, Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), Ooredoo Myanmar, Frontiir, StreamNet, Golden TMH Telecom, Internet Maekhong Network (IM-Net), Myanmar Broadband Telecom (MBT), Myanmar Telecommunication Network (MTN), Campana, Global Technology Group, and China Unicom259. Shortly after the coup, one of the country’s four telecommunications service providers, Telenor, a Norway-based company, sold its business to a military-linked firm in 2021. The company said it would otherwise have been required to help the military regime conduct surveillance on its clients in order to continue operating. The move was controversial, as many raised concerns about the company’s accountability. Although the decision to exit appeared well-intentioned, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) revealed in August 2025 that Telenor had repeatedly complied with military requests to hand over user data, putting its customers at risk hundreds of times after the coup260. The data shared included names, addresses, call logs, last known locations, and national ID numbers, which the junta could use to identify and arrest dissidents. According to NRK, at least 1,300 customers had their data handed over or had their phones blocked at the junta’s request, and Telenor’s own analysis showed that nearly 500 customers may have been at risk of arrest if their data was shared261. Henshaw, Caroline, and Aung Naing. “European Govts Back Company That Uses Chinese Tech to Monitor Myanmar Internet Users.” Myanmar Now, 23 May 2025, myanmar-now.org/en/news/ european-govts-back-company-that-uses-chinese-tech-to-monitor-myanmar-internet-users. 258. Potkin, Fanny, and Poppy McPherson. “Insight: How Myanmar’s Military Moved in on the Telecoms Sector to Spy on Citizens.” Reuters, 19 May 2021, www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-myanmarsmilitary-moved-telecoms-sector-spy-citizens-2021-05-18. 259. “Silk Road of Surveillance: The Role of China’s Geedge Networks and Myanmar Telecommunications Operators in the Junta’s Digital Terror Campaign.” Justice For Myanmar, 2025, jfm-files.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/public/Silk+Road+of+Surveillance+EN.pdf. 260. Wilde-Ramsing, Joseph. “Telenor’s Irresponsible Disengagement From Myanmar.” SOMO, 20 Aug. 2025, www.somo.nl/telenors-irresponsible-disengagement-from-myanmar. 261. “Parliament Probes Telenor’s Exit From War-Torn Myanmar.” News in English, 16 Dec. 2025, www. newsinenglish.no/2025/12/16/parliament-probes-telenors-exit-from-war-torn-myanmar. 257. 59