Filling in the Gap: Moving Forward with Future Work Given these developments, it is clear that governments and regimes across Southeast Asia are intensifying their use of digital strategies to suppress dissent and secure political advantage. Regarding information control, several areas warrant further exploration. These include examining how state-affiliated coordinated networks operate to serve political interests by harassing critics and disseminating disinformation and propaganda. Much of this work will require building the capacity of civil society to document such activities, which often demands technical skills to detect and analyze these networks. The 2025 court case in Thailand on information operations (IO) illustrates why further investigation is critical. The case stemmed from a 2021 lawsuit in which three activists sued the Royal Thai Army for allegedly conducting IO (see Thailand chapter). One of the biggest challenges lay in proving that the accounts in question were part of an IO network and that their activities were coordinated. Although the court accepted that the documents submitted as evidence—showing instructions for IO operations—were authentic, it dismissed the case, reasoning that the harassment of activists could have been carried out by individuals acting on their own personal beliefs. The lesson from this situation is the need to demonstrate that the accounts attacking activists are part of a coordinated network and are being directed to do so. Network analysis can reveal patterns in how these accounts operate as a coordinated network— for example, by posting the same content at around the same time. Another concern is the rise of AI, which will further complicate this landscape, as stateaffiliated cybertroopers become equipped with AI-generated content. Developments in 2025 show that state-affiliated cyber armies in Thailand and Vietnam are learning to produce such content. AI-generated content was extensively documented in the 2025 midterm elections in the Philippines, as well as in the Indonesian general election earlier in 2024. These events set a precedent that AI will play an increasingly crucial role in the online space. This technology has the potential to harm democracy, as it can shape state-affiliated disinformation and propaganda campaigns. This situation makes it equally important for civil society to build AI literacy and develop the skills needed to detect and respond to these technologies. Disinformation and propaganda are also closely tied to the issue of platform accountability. While politically motivated censorship is the main concern in many Southeast Asian countries, broader discussions on platform accountability in the region remain limited—particularly regarding how platform design and architecture can fuel disinformation and propaganda. 21