In Cambodia, the 2025 border conflict with Thailand offers insights into how information disorders and propaganda are systematically produced by state actors under Hun Sen’s leadership1. The regime has previously been documented for its state-affiliated cyber armies, but the growing role of state agencies and key figures in producing propaganda and disinformation—later amplified through pro-regime media—marks a notable development in how the regime manipulates information for its political interests 2. This situation is the result of years of crackdowns on independent media and critical voices. In Indonesia, where the government has a history of employing political buzzers to support its policies and initiatives since Joko Widodo’s tenure, their use has persisted under Prabowo Subianto’s government3. This has been particularly evident during the 2025 protests against the government. A network of coordinated, inauthentic accounts benefiting Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim was uncovered by Malaysiakini, an independent media outlet, in October 20254. The discovery suggests that this operation was driven by a political agenda, likely aimed at boosting Anwar’s reputation as his political coalition faces a serious challenge from the growing popularity of the hardline Islamist party Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS). In Myanmar, in the events leading up to the sham election scheduled for the end of 2025, a pro-junta coordinated network was documented. It was also found that TikTok has been added to the list of prominent platforms used by pro-junta figures. While this is not surprising, given that pro-military cyber troopers have been documented before, these developments show that Facebook remains a key platform for pro-military figures to conduct election campaigns, despite being officially blocked following the coup. The incident also shows that TikTok has now become part of the information ecosystem, a change from the situation during the 2020 election. “The State-Affiliated Systematic Disinformation Campaign and Propaganda in Cambodia.” DigitalReach, 15 Dec. 2025, digitalreach.asia/news/blog-news/the-state-affiliated-systematic-disinformationcampaign-and-propaganda-in-cambodia. 2. Ibid. 3. “Efforts to Undermine Demonstrations Through Influencers.” Tempo.co, 4 Sep. 2025, www.tempo.co/ politik/narasi-influencer-merepsons-tuntutan-demonstran-2066522. 4. Koh, Jun Lin. “Deception and Data: Inside Pro-Anwar CIB Network Investigation.” Malaysiakini, 1 Oct. 2025, www.malaysiakini.com/news/756652. 1. 11