5/17/22, 11:25 PM Myanmar’s post-coup Internet: dangers and alternatives websites, most notably Facebook and Twitter. More recently, since May 2021 the military has shifted to a “whitelisting” strategy, enabling access to specific apps such as Zoom, LinkedIn, and various mobile banking applications, via mobile data. Other forms of internet use still require fibre connection, while the aforementioned blacklisted websites, like Facebook and Twitter, remain inaccessible without a Virtual Private Network (VPN). This ‘whitelisting’ of apps for mobile data usage is likely being practiced in the hopes of staving off an impending economic crisis. However, more crude tactics are still at work. During the National Unity Government’s first press conference on 4 June 2021, the SAC blocked internet access throughout the country. Myo expressed the need to better understand these haphazard tactics and the anti-coup movement’s hopes of circumventing them: ‘this is an area for us, activists and revolutionaries, to study more.’ An anti-coup digital culture In Myo’s words, ‘to answer the question: did the military succeed? I would say no.’ This is partly due to the SAC’s inability to navigate Feldstein’s “dictator’s digital dilemma”, but it can also be attributed to civilians’ ability to circumvent repression. In the face of repression, internet users across Myanmar have developed a thriving anti-coup digital culture through which they experiment with new protest tactics, engender community, and keep one another safe. The creativity of Myanmar’s protesters has been widely remarked, and extends into the digital realm. Saijai provided three observations on this matter. Firstly, civilians use the Internet to keep safe and to circumvent blocks. For instance, civilians shifted to Signal, which allows for end-to-end encrypted communications, amid rising fears of surveillance. Secondly, civilians have formulated protest tactics based on the unique capacities of various apps. Saijai showed that Twitter has become particularly significant during the coup because its interface allows protesters to communicate effectively with the outside world. Amid the closure of media outlets, civilians use Twitter to obtain news—both from formal outlets and from each other. Trending hashtags, such as #whatshappeninginmyanmar, are testament to the groundswell of anti-coup sentiment in Myanmar. Protesters also use Twitter to tag specific, well-known journalists, thereby using Twitter to ‘gather international attention to Myanmar.’ Protesters thus use both the one-to-one and many-to-many communicative functions of Twitter to great effect. Thirdly, Saijai discussed how protesters were supporting one another through the internet. Protesters have used OpenStreetMap to track the location of police forces in big cities, while the app Way Way Nay provides users with a list of military-linked individuals and businesses, making boycotts easy and accessible. Their use of these apps shows how online engagements feed into the offline activities of protesters. They also show how protesters foment community online, amidst brutal offline crackdowns. ‘I see young people translating frustration and anger into innovation,’ Saijai said, ‘it touches my heart to see them supporting each other.’ Widespread smartphone ownership in big cities also allows citizens to assist journalists in a hostile media landscape, in which journalists—working for both local and foreign media outlets—face arrest, https://teacircleoxford.com/essay/myanmars-post-coup-internet-dangers-and-alternatives/ 4/11