Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) Crime as Cognitive Constraint response to what other experts have already commented upon. 27 It is also meant to function as a cautionary tale for technologies operating in incitement contexts. 28 The term “speech” used in this article refers to the full range of modalities of expression. This article will proceed in four parts. Part I begins with an account of Myanmar’s speech landscape following the country’s political transition, and Facebook’s role in shaping public discourse against the Rohingya. Part II provides an overview of prohibited speech under international law and the current regimes of legal responsibility for incitement to genocide. Laying out the legal landscape for speech in this manner will reveal how extant regimes result in a gap in liability for corporate involvement in mass atrocity crimes. Part III discusses the common response to this gap – to push for the prosecution of juridical or legal persons, whether domestically or internationally. However, I will argue, using Facebook in Myanmar as an example, how translating harm in the language of crime can eclipse other cognitive frames, such as tort. Part IV briefly sketches the promise of international tort liability and the contours of an international mechanism, building on Steinitz’s blueprint for an International Court of Civil Justice. I. Background The outbreak of violence in October 2016 and August 2017 in Myanmar’s Rakhine state forms the factual situation of the ICC’s investigation. 29 These attacks did not spring from nowhere; they were the culmination of decades of government-orchestrated communal tension between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims. 30 In the years preceding the attacks, “nationalistic political parties and politicians, leading monks, academics, prominent individuals, and 27. See sources cited, supra note 23. 28. For instance, after Facebook banned Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing from the platform, Myanmar military accounts started to appear in the Russian social media platform, VKontakte. After Facebook ban, Myanmar military accounts are moving to Russian social media site Vkontakte, VOICES ADVOX (Sept. 7, 2018), GLOBAL https://advox.globalvoices.org/2018/09/07/after-facebook-banmyanmar-military-accounts-are-moving-to-russian-social-media-sitevkontakte/ [https://perma.cc/3EJ4-GGZ2]. 29. Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of Myanmar, Case No. ICC-01/19, Prosecutor’s Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, ¶ 5 (July 4, 2019), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_03510.PDF (stating that “the 2017 wave of violence was closely related to another wave of violence that started on or about 9 October 2016”). 30. See Francis Wade, MYANMAR’S ENEMY WITHIN: BUDDHIST VIOLENCE AND MAKING OF A MUSLIM ‘OTHER’ (2017). THE 150