Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) Crime as Cognitive Constraint The first treaty would, inter alia, create the court and establish its jurisdiction in the territory of states parties... The Rome Statute provides a useful example. It established the ICC; delimited its relationship with the United Nations; set out, inter alia, its jurisdiction; defined the crimes it would adjudicate; adopted as law certain general principles of criminal law; determined the composition and administration of the court; outlined pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures; laid out an international cooperation and judicial assistance scheme, enforcement procedures, and obligations; and set out financing provisions. The second treaty… would be an enforcement treaty along the lines of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, known as the New York Convention. Recognition and enforcement are the lynchpins of binding dispute resolution, and, as noted throughout, the difficulty plaintiffs encounter in obtaining enforceable judgments is the motivating problem behind the proposal to set up an ICCJ. 298 The ICCJ Statute is intended for host states where the injury usually occurs, while the ICCJ enforcement treaty is meant to attract home states of transnational corporations. 299 However, corporate involvement in Rome Statute crimes may complicate this two-tiered membership system. The ICCJ, even if deriving its normative content from Rome Statute crimes, must be carefully designed so as not to be bound by ICC legal rulings and findings of fact. Suppose the ICCJ were to adjudicate a case involving a US company involved in a Rome Statute crime in Myanmar, where both the US and Myanmar are not state-parties to the Rome Statute. If the ICCJ Statute were designed to track the work of the ICC, this would effectively render the work of the ICC consequential for parties whose home states are not state parties to the Rome Statute. Thus, an independent legal determination of the ICCJ seems called for, in the same way that the ICJ is not bound by legal determinations of international criminal tribunals on questions of general international law. 300 For Steinitz, the complementarity principle in the Rome Statute should not apply as an admissibility threshold to the ICCJ because 298. Id. 299. See Id. at 10. 300. See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment on the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Reports 43, ¶ 402-405 (Feb. 26) (ruling that the ICJ is not bound by the ICTY’s decision as the issue relates to resolving questions of general international law). 195