Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) Crime as Cognitive Constraint intentional conduct that causes harm to someone else. 243 How such an international tort liability should be conceived in full detail, however, is beyond the scope of this article and deserves further study. A. Rationale In examining the wisdom of corporate criminal liability generally, V.S. Khanna argues that corporate criminal liability is “socially desirable when substantially all of its traits are socially desirable.”244 But only if some are, exploring other corporate liability regimes merit further consideration. For Carsten Stahn, the “benefits of criminal responsibility over civil liability for human rights accountability are not always fully clear.” 245 This is because corporations are rarely the “masterminds of international crimes, but rather benefit from a given situation.” 246 Thus, the idea of corporate international criminal liability should not be “romanticized.” 247 The appeal of tort law lies in its ability to accommodate broad categories of conduct. Tort’s flexible features enable conceptualization of different modalities of behavior, including wrongs committed in the context of an armed conflict. 248 Nominate torts address specific harms (e.g. defamation, trespass) whereas the more elastic tort of negligence possesses the general capacity to “recognize new wrongs, and new rights (or interests).” 249 Importantly, “[r]egulation is inherent in tort law.” 250 243. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, 3 CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS EXPERT LEGAL PANEL ON CORPORATE COMPLIANCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 10 (2008), https://www.icj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/Vol.3-Corporate-legal-accountability-thematicreport-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/D28Y-AUL4]. 244. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1532 (1996). 245. Stahn, supra note 192, at 124. 246. Id. at 122. 247. Id. at 124. 248. See, e.g., Eric Mongelard, Corporate Civil Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 665, 687 (2006) (arguing that “there is no reason why, at least in theory, a new tort should not be created for [] violations [of international humanitarian law]”). 249. Jonathan Morgan, Torts and Technology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY 522-23 (Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford & Karen Yeung eds., 2017). 250. Id. at 523. Although Ratner argues against domestic tort law due to its divergence across jurisdictions, this may be avoided precisely by negotiating a treaty that would settle these differences. See Steven Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L. J. 443, 543 (2001). 185