Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) Crime as Cognitive Constraint treaty also obligates the state to impose civil and administrative sanctions against corporations. 209 However, the addition of a penal sanction has arguably generated more celebration, as it would, for one, solve the “persistent ambiguity” surrounding corporate criminal liability. 210 It is worth emphasizing that efforts towards prosecuting corporations internationally or domestically for serious international crimes share a similar objective – to expand the coverage of crime. The stories thus far have been one of accommodation: if criminal law does not cover corporations, then make it so. It reflects the assumption that criminal law should be the lens through which harm must be appreciated. The only question that remains is how to adjust the rules of the game. B. Crime as cognitive constraint: Facebook as a “useful instrument” for hate speech in Myanmar The Facebook issue in Myanmar demonstrates how international criminal law provides no cognitive frame for comprehending the split between speaker and non-state curators of speech in instances of incitement to genocide posted online. Responsibility is rendered more difficult to articulate because platform involvement is unhinged from the laws of territoriality and physicality. In the BSR report, Facebook was found to be “directly linked” to such speech, using the language of the UNGPs, but the concept of “direct link” is not conceptually available in the language of crime. 211 The language of crime thus leaves out other possible actors beyond the speaker. It also potentially hinders tinkering with other remedies. Traditional cases of corporate entanglement in gross human rights violations required a knowing act or omission on the part of a corporate agent. This was apparent in the prosecution of corporate officers before the Nuremberg Tribunal for using slave labor and supplying weapons to exterminate the Jews. 212 In its legal conception, complicity is understood as aiding and abetting. 213 Complicity generally required 209. Lopez, supra note 204. 210. Nadia Bernaz, Including Corporate Criminal Liability for International Crimes in the Business and Human Rights Treaty: Necessary but Insufficient, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/including-corporate-criminal-liability-forinternational-crimes-in-the-business-and-human-rights-treaty-necessarybut-insufficient [https://perma.cc/HR23-RG6V] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020); See also Davoise, supra note 201. 211. BSR Report, supra note 168, at 35. 212. See Ole Kristian Fauchald & Jo Stigent, Corporate Responsibility Before International Institutions, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1025, 1036-37 (2009). 213. What is Complicity or Accomplice Liability?, FINDLAW, https://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-law-basics/what-is-complicity-or- 178