Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) Crime as Cognitive Constraint there is no functional equivalent of a prosecutor to speak of. 301 Instead, “the party responsible for ‘prosecuting’ the claim is the same at the international and national levels – the plaintiffs.” 302 This also supports her position to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the ICCJ and exclude the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies for admissibility. The draft BHR treaty, if it takes effect, may change this assessment. Nonetheless, other kinds of admissibility thresholds may be incorporated. Weighing the perceived advantages of international tort liability against its anticipated challenges, there is reason to conclude that, at the least, international tort liability merits further exploration. V. Conclusion As regulatory approaches are currently being explored, policymakers should recognize the “implicit central object” of platforms, at least in their early days – the Western, white man. Such technology was “not developed with partly free countries like Kenya [or Myanmar] in mind.” 303 With this article, I aimed to show how this gap in perspective can impact incitement landscapes. The Facebook dilemma illustrates how platforms can be a potent – even deadly – force in transitional countries where public infrastructure is weak, democracy is fragile, and atrocious acts are unfolding. In such contexts, the need to balance competing values of expression and safety becomes more pressing, with the scales tipping towards the latter. This article does not pretend to provide a magic formula on how to strike this balance; it does, however, aim to convince how corporations can be required to do so. Notably, Facebook’s ban of Myanmar’s Commander-in-Chief from the platform was not prompted by an official directive from the US government (as home state) or the UN. 304 Facebook was pressured by the court of public opinion. 305 However, companies’ profit motive will not always align with the public interest, and the court of public opinion cannot solely be relied upon as the means to regulate corporate involvement in mass atrocity crimes. Thus, there seems to be merit in legally regulating corporate behavior. This article aimed to set the tone for such future conversations. It lays out the conceptual landscape necessary to draw a regulatory framework for companies “present” in mass atrocity settings, “fostering” atrocity crimes. Facebook’s role in Myanmar’s incitement landscape displays other modalities of harm that unsettle current 301. See Steinitz, supra note 240, at 160. 302. Id. 303. Nyabola, supra note 97, at 200-201. 304. See FACEBOOK, supra note 235. 305. See id. 196