Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) Crime as Cognitive Constraint power wielded against a state actor. It is definitely not the only case to raise the issue. 276 This embodies Duncan Kennedy’s argument of the “loopification” of the public-private distinction discussed in Part 1, where, in order to define one category, one needs to come full circle.277 In this light, Klonick’s description of platforms as the “new governors,” 278 to the extent that platforms regulate users’ speech, is incomplete in incitement contexts such as Myanmar. Here, the new governors not only reign over the traditionally governed – the public — but even govern the old governors themselves. Although platforms can theoretically exercise this power anywhere, and ban the speech of other world leaders such as US President Trump, what differentiates Myanmar is that here, Facebook, in fact, did, whether rightly or wrongly. Here, private power confronts state authority. The private-public flip in this case breaks ground. To repeat, it deviates from the traditional model of non-state actors’ complicity in human rights violations of state actors. This turns on its head the issue of vertical and horizontal equalities in tort law. Nathan J. Miller highlights the difference between a public agent who commits the wrong while exercising a public function and a private individual who commits it as such. 279 For Miller, “[t]he victim of a public wrong and the alleged wrongdoer do not have the same bundle of rights and obligations because they are, in a sense, completely different kinds of actors. The former is a citizen, but the latter is a representative of the state and an extension of the powers granted to it by citizens collectively – such as the monopoly over the use of force.” 280 Miller makes this distinction to argue for a public tort to address human rights abuses perpetrated by corporations. The questions posed in this paper, however, are radically different from Miller’s premise. 281 In Myanmar’s incitement landscape, 276. See, e.g., Tara Van Ho, Twitter’s Responsibility to Suspend Trump’s, and Rouhani’s, Accounts, Part 1, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 21, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/21/twitters-responsibility-to-suspendtrumps-and-rouhanis-accounts-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/SL8X-GBV9]; Tara Van Ho, Twitter’s Responsibility to Suspend Trump’s, and Rouhani’s, Accounts, Part 2, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 21, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/21/twitters-responsibility-to-suspendtrumps-and-rouhanis-accounts-part-2/ [https://perma.cc/TVG6-L7JF]. 277. The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 103, at 1354–55. 278. Klonick, supra note 275, at 1603. 279. See Nathan J. Miller, Human Rights Abuses as Tort Harms: Losses in Translation, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 538–39 (2016). 280. Id. at 543. 281. Miller, supra note 279, at 528 n. 128 (noting that “in the context of the discussion of MNEs that international human rights law and the law applied in ATS cases… are only concerned with the conduct of 190