An Overview of Cyber Troop Activity in Azerbaijan. Organizational Form Early reports of social media manipulation in Azerbaijan first emerged in 2011 and focused on IRELI (“Forward”) Youth (also called Ireli youth union or IRELI Youth Group) (AZ News Staff, 2011). IRELI Youth was formed in 2005, only a few months after a similar youth group called Nashi emerged in Russia (Durna Safarova, 2018). It is affiliated with the government and was established in order to “take active part in information war”. More recently, IRELI’s profile has declined, in part due to controversies surrounding its leader’s ties to the Fethullah Gülen movement, a controversial group denounced by the current Turkish government (Durna Safarova, 2018). Instead, the strategy seems to have evolved to concentrate on the creation and maintenance of large Facebook groups which post predominantly positive messages about Azerbaijani history. It has been confirmed that these are funded by the government, although this is not publicly disclosed (Durna Safarova, 2018). IRELI’s decline since 2014 is also due to the departure of leading figures in the group (the organization’s leader Elnur Aslanov and its secretary-general Rauf Mardiyev). Following this, various other youth organizations such as the youth branches of the ruling party (Yeni (‘New’) Azerbaijani Party) have taken over their efforts (Earle, 2017; Geybulla, 2016). Youth groups allow a degree of plausible deniability and their involvement is preferred because they are cheaper to employ and more adept at using social media (Earle, 2017). While some trolling efforts are coordinated by youth groups, it is also possible that some young people join in with the harassment independently (DeGeurin, 2018). In February 2018 President Ilham Aliyev announced a snap presidential election to be held on 11 April, which resulted in Aliyev securing another seven-year term. Given the restrictions imposed upon traditional media outlets, social media is used by activists and the opposition to disseminate information and organize campaigns. In the lead-up to the election, progovernment trolls and commentators were exceedingly active online (Freedom House, 2018). Political trolls often used comments copied and pasted from presidential or government statements—these individuals are said to be ruling party members, civil servants, and other pro-government supporters (Geybulla & Muntezir, 2018). In February 2018, Deputy Prime Minister Ali Ahmadov told members of the party’s youth branch to use social media effectively and make necessary “sacrifices” ahead of the election, with many seeing this as an invitation to attack the opposition (Freedom House, 2018). These attacks came from personal social media accounts, but also from fake accounts disguised with different names, with the authors of the report noting that, while Azerbaijan is far from being equipped with troll factories equivalent to those active in Russia, it is “catching up” (Geybulla & Muntezir, 2018). It is also worth noting that there were several allegations surrounding the activities of Ali Hasanov, the president’s former Assistant for Public and Political affairs, primarily response for the government’s relationship with the media. It was alleged that Hasanov was linked to the actions of the government’s internet trolls (Safarova, 2020). However, he was dismissed on November 2019. 28