IRAN Introduction The Islamic Republic of Iran has gained prominence as a sophisticated computational propaganda actor. The manipulation of social media takes place in the context of domestic Internet controls which have resulted in repeated shutdowns—most recently in response to anti-regime protests in November 2019. The extent of Iran’s foreign influence campaigns has also been revealed through repeated platform suspensions by Facebook and Twitter for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. Mis- and disinformation about the coronavirus pandemic have spread in Iran. The low turnout in the February 2020 parliamentary elections was blamed on the “negative propaganda” of Iran’s enemies by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (Hafezi, 2020). Health-related misinformation allegedly lead to more than seven hundred deaths in Iran after fake rumours spread claiming that methanol could cure coronavirus (Forrest, 2020). Reports have also indicated that Iran has used the coronavirus pandemic to propagate anti-American and antiIsraeli narratives, such as the conspiracy that coronavirus is a “biological ethnic weapon” (Aarabi, 2020). An Overview of Cyber Troop Activity in Iran Organizational Form The state has been monitoring Iranian social media activity to dismantle protests since 2010 (Murphy & Dodds, 2020). There are multiple organizations tasked with this social media manipulation, but their size and organization are disputed. A report by the Atlantic Council (2020) found evidence that Iran was operating Facebook and Twitter sock-puppet accounts created in 2010. The report suggested that Iran’s digital influence efforts involve “different elements of Iran’s digital apparatus” which evidence the involvement of multiple government agencies. The BBC (2017) reported that the government announced a ‘Cyber Basij’ had 18,000 online volunteers to flag questionable content online. Platform suspensions have been linked to two media actors. Accounts have been attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Corporation (IRIB), the Iranian state media organization (Nimmo, Eib, et al., 2020). An IRIB network dismantled in April 2020 had been active since 2011. A further network of accounts has been dubbed the International Union of Virtual Media (IUVM) after the main media outlet involved in disseminating disinformation (Nimmo, Francois, et al., 2020). This entity is a “prolific operator” that has taken a geopolitical approach reflecting that of the Iranian government, and has been linked to accounts on Facebook, Google, and Twitter. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is alleged to be partly responsible for Iran’s offensive cyber capabilities. The Telecommunications Company of Iran was wholly acquired by the IRGC in 2009, strengthening its power and oversight over Iran’s communications (Murphy & Dodds, 2020). Iran has also actively engaged in cyberwarfare under the IRGC. Hacking divisions are commonly called ‘kittens’ and have engaged in cyberattacks and cyber espionage, including by setting up fake personas on platforms like Facebook and LinkedIn. The People’s Mujahedin Organization (Mujahedin-e Khalq, or MEK) has an active online presence from their base in Tirana, Albania. The MEK is an exiled opposition group that has been designated a terrorist organisation (Benjamin, 2016). The Guardian reported that former 194