KUWAIT Introduction Kuwait operates a hybrid governance structure, with a constitutional emirate working alongside a semi-democratic political system (Selvik, 2011). Executive power lies with the Sabah family monarchy which appoints the cabinet of ministers. The prime minister is appointed by the emir, but the elected parliament is still able to challenge the government (Freedom House, 2020). However, political parties are banned in Kuwait, which has prevented the formation of a coherent political opposition (MacDonald, 2020). Kuwait is the only Arab State in the Arabian Gulf to be labelled “partly free” by Freedom House (Freedom House, 2020). However, it is important to note that recently Kuwait has been increasingly constraining freedoms of speech and assembly (Freedom House, 2020). Media freedom is limited within Kuwait, and legislation penalises critics of the emir, Islam or calls for the removal of the Sabah monarchy (BBC News, 2020; Freedom House, 2020). There are also legal penalties for spreading particular information online. Aisha al-Rasheed, a wellknown journalist in Kuwait, was detained for social media postings where she criticised government corruption (Freedom House, 2020). In September 2020 Sheikh Nawaf took over as emir, following the death of his half-brother Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah. Sheikh Nawaf has ascended to power during a time when Kuwait is struggling to manage its budget deficit, given the recent fall in oil prices and the COVID-19 pandemic (MacDonald, 2020). An Overview of Cyber Troop Activity in Kuwait Organizational Form Cyber troops are called “electronic flies” by Kuwaiti media, rather than bots, as officials claim that all bots in Kuwait were eliminated three years ago (Al-Qabas, 2019b). One example of a campaign by the “electronic flies” spread rumours that Kuwait was insisting Egyptian workers return to Egypt, even covering the travel and quarantine expenses for these workers. The campaign sought to build on pre-existing anti-immigrant sentiment in Kuwait, which has heightened during the pandemic (Sabr, 2020). Inauthentic social media campaigns are both the result of, and contributing to, Kuwait’s political instability. Kuwaiti media advisor Ahmed al-Eissa claimed that inauthentic Twitter campaigns were a prominent factor in the 2011 protests which led to the dissolution of parliament, and the frequent government reshuffles and parliamentary elections in the following years (Al-Rai, 2019; Freedom House, 2020). Political figures are said to be responsible for inciting social media campaigns to achieve particular political agendas. One example of this was the prevalence of Twitter campaigns after two ministers, Sheikh Mohammed al-Abdullah (Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, formerly minister of information and minister of health) and Sheikh Suleiman al-Homoud (former minister of information and former minister of state for youth and sports) were questioned in parliament (Al-Qabas, 2019b). Reports claim that these campaigns contributed significantly to their subsequent dismissal (Al-Qabas, 2019b). In another example, the website of Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Qabas outlines ten issues it claims have attracted the most bots and inauthentic users online (Al-Qabas, 2019b). One such issue is the topic of early retirement, which it claims was at the centre of a Twitter campaign seeking 231