KENYA Introduction While Kenya is officially a democratic country it continues to struggle with corruption and police brutality and is considered only partly free by Freedom House (Freedom House, 2019a). Nevertheless, the country has a vibrant media landscape, though concerns about costs, speed and quality of internet access remain prevalent (Freedom House, 2019b). Kenya has seen its fair share of fake news and misinformation campaigns during the 2017 presidential election where opposing parties hired bloggers, social media influencers, and political consulting companies to support online campaign efforts with their social media insights (Nyabola, 2019). Moreover, Kenya has been struggling with Twitter bots (Muli, 2019), which had quite significant influence on online discourse with 25% influence during the August 2017 election and 28% influence during the rerun of the election in October 2017 (Freedom House, 2018b). Notably, it appears that many of the influential voices on Twitter during the election were located not only outside of Kenya, but outside Africa entirely (Mbah, 2018). Generally, this election was characterized as the Kenyan election most affected by fake news (Dahir, 2017). In terms of access, while a majority of Kenyans have phone subscriptions (Freedom House (2019b) found a subscription penetration rate of 100.1% in late 2018) and access to the Internet, there is still a gender and urban/rural divide. Facebook and WhatsApp continue to be the most popular platforms used (Elliott, 2017). In general, Kenya does not filter or block Internet access, however, the government does regularly remove content or requests for content to be removed from platforms such as Facebook (Freedom House, 2019b). During the COVID-19 pandemic, WhatsApp has become a breeding ground for harmful misinformation about the virus. It seems the Kenyan government has been struggling to curb the spread of fake information and news and is now hoping for a technical solution from Facebook (which owns WhatsApp) (Ngila, 2020) and relying on volunteers and activists to debunk false claims (Smith, 2020). An Overview of Cyber Troop Activity in Kenya Organizational Form During the general elections in 2017 both main parties (the ruling Jubilee Party and the main opposition party Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)) reportedly used bots and fake accounts or bloggers on Facebook (Mayoyo, 2017), with Jubilee, for example, hiring Cambridge Analytica. News websites, including Foreign Policy Journal (fp-news.com) and CNN Channel 1 (cnnchannel1.com), were set up to spread fake news during the election. The sites’ branding resembles official international media outlets (Nyabola, 2019). The ruling Jubilee party had been engaging in online influence operations as early as 2015, when reports surfaced that they hired a group known as ’36 bloggers’ to polish the crumbling image of the government at the time (Kenya Today, 2015). Kenya’s government has also become an avid surveillant of its citizens’ communication in recent years (Freedom House, 2019a). Several state actors carry out surveillance essentially free from any judicial oversight. The main intelligence agency is the National Intelligence Service (NIS), which is responsible for both national security and foreign intelligence. The NIS has direct access to Kenya’s telecommunication network and Internet providers. In addition to the activities of the NIS the Kenyan police services also have a surveillance mandate, allowing them to collect information about serious crimes, including cybercrime. In 2012 the Kenyan Communication Commission (a state-owned corporation) announced the establishment of a system allowing authorities to monitor incoming and outgoing digital communication. All 227