Beyond official government diplomacy organizations, Israel has developed a large network of coordinated volunteer groups in Israel and around the world, comprising mainly of students, whose main task is to spread pro-Israel messages and counter anti-Israel and BDS messages online. Most of these coordinated volunteer networks began during the Operation Pillar of Defense and Operation Protective Edge between Israel and Gaza in 2012 and 2014, in which the office of the Prime Minister budgeted ILS 3 million shekels towards building a “shadow unit” with the Israeli Student Union to manage hasbara efforts on social media. The initiative included: paying students through scholarships to take part in spreading pro-Israel messages, combatting anti-Israel narratives online, and the development of a government unit of interactive media to be in charge of the governments Hasbara in the social media realm (Ravid, 2013). This campaign continued through 2015 in which the National Hasbara Office funded a joint initiative between students and the Stand With Us organization to allow students to take part in Israel’s public diplomacy efforts online. According to the office, this decision comes after the previous volunteer campaigns were found to have played a crucial and successful role in “spreading reliable information and a balanced discourse on social media” (Zarhia, 2015). These new campaigns were to be coordinated together with several international Jewish organizations, such as the World Union of Jewish Students, the Jewish National Fund, the Jewish Agency, and the World Jewish Congress (Ibid). Political social media manipulation: The second segment of computational propaganda in Israel, as mentioned above, is more directly related to the issue of political social media manipulation aimed at influencing Israeli citizens’ public opinions, mostly during election periods. Various parties and politicians in Israel have taken part in this kind of computational propaganda, though direct links are yet to be evidenced. In the past year Israel had three general elections, which led to increases in coordinated online behavior. Some of the first evidence of social media manipulation were found during Israel’s municipal elections in 2018, leading to Facebook taking down thousands of fake accounts (Ginosar and Liberman, 2018). Manipulation of online media for political interests was also evident in the national elections in 2019. An investigation by the Yediot Aharonot newspaper revealed a large network of fake Twitter accounts that were promoting Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s campaign and attacking his opponent, Benyamin Gantz. Even though no direct connection was found between the Likud party’s campaign and the coordinated network, people close to the campaign, including the prime minister’s son, Yair Netanyahu, have shared messages posted by these accounts. For example, the holder of one of the central accounts, named “BOND”, revealed that he is a “covert activist” for the Likud party and that his online activity is funded. The exposure of this network has raised suspicions of a range of criminal offenses, including violations of Israel’s Propaganda Law, violations of election financing, violations of privacy, and more (N12 News 2019). Alternative Enforcement: The third type of computational propaganda identified in this case study does not fall under the category of social media manipulation and is mostly aimed at law enforcement and online safety purposes that are not intended for political benefit. During the 2015-2016 wave of terrorist stabbing attacks against Israelis the distribution of online content inciting young Palestinians to continue the attacks was evident. By consequence, 210