narratives, and attacking dissidents. Content promoted by China-backed manipulators typically attempt to discredit the legitimacy of protesters and promote a positive image of the Chinese government. Some messages have promoted conspiratorial narratives blaming the west for sowing unrest in Hong Kong (Borat, 2019). Accounts found by Twitter and Facebook that were used to promote these messages were hacked, automated, and fake accounts (Kao and Li, 2020). A typical strategy that has been used for attacking dissidents is “doxing”, which refers to the publishing of private information belonging to a particular individual with the intent of provoking harassment or physical harm. In November 2019, Hong Kong’s Privacy Commissioner for Personal data has reported approximately 2,000 cases of doxing since the protests began. Some of the websites that store these lists of dissident information are based on mainland-Chinese or Russian servers and use so-called bulletproof anonymous hosting. Bulletproof hosting is a service provided by web hosting firms that allows their customers to upload materials that are usually not allowed to be distributed by many regular service providers. By doing so, bulletproof hosts usually allow content providers to bypass the terms of service regulating Internet content in a specific country. These sites have been promoted by groups that are linked to the Chinese Communist Party, which is believed to be responsible for over two hundred cases of doxing (Chan & Blundy, 2019). Taiwan Elections: A recent study by the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden has found Taiwan to be the country most exposed to foreign false news dissemination. So-called content mills have been disseminating fake news around the country, specifically messages against incumbent president Tsai Ing-Wen who has been a main advocate for disengagement from China. These stories include one that accused her of lying about her Doctorate degree (Kuo & Yang, 2019). Besides spreading fake news, these media manipulators have been introducing other novel ways in which they can manipulate opinions, argues Jarvis Chiu, senior manager for the Institute of Information Industry in Taiwan. These include armies of trolls that leave comments in strategic places and by such try to shift the focus of the debate. Moreover, fake accounts have been used to share pro-Beijing messages and amplify specific content, while “subliminal attacks” have included repeatedly searching for a candidate’s name in order to influence search algorithms. These attacks have not been directly linked to Chinese state actors, however, some links have been found, including one Chinese defector, Wang Liqiang, who revealed that he was instructed to interfere in Taiwan’s midterm elections in 2018, as well as the presidential elections held in race in January 2020 (Kuo & Yang, 2019). COVID-19: Italy’s recent battle with the COVID-19 pandemic has received tremendous attention from Chinese disinformation campaigns. With the outbreak of the pandemic in Italy, China has enhanced its dissemination of carefully picked bits of information and narratives depicting it as an ally and saviour of the Italian people. In addition to artificial amplification techniques, such as hashtag manipulation by coordinated bots, it has also partaken in the creation of fake info-graphs and videos. These messages were then widely shared by official accounts tied to the Chinese Government, such as the Chinese embassy, official state media, and other official representatives (DFRLab, 2020). 73