Table 1: Organizational Form and Prevalence of Social Media Manipulation in Kyrgyzstan Initial Government Politicians & Private Contractors Civil Society Citizens & Report Agencies Parties Organizations Influencers 2010 X President Freelance Sooronbay trolls Jeenbekov, former President Almazbek Atambayev Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. Strategies, Tools, and Techniques Fake Accounts According to Azattyk (the Kyrgyz service of Radio Liberty), Kyrgyz activists have noted that fake accounts spreading false information are active in the country. Human rights activist Aziza Abdirasulova said that websites and social networks should be more stringent in stopping accounts without a name or photo from registering (Азаттык, 2018). It is alleged that these anonymous accounts not only respond to existing news, but help set the agenda by leaking stories to the media (Rysaliev et al., 2012). Anonymous, fake accounts respond to criticism online—an investigation into a corruption scandal surrounding the Matraimov family prompted an “army of trolls and fake accounts” coming to their defence on social media (Kaktus, 2019). In response to this problem, one of the country’s most popular forums, Diesel, has imposed a month-long waiting period for each new user. An MP for the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan, Asilbek Zheenbekov, suggested monitoring social networks to combat anonymous, fake accounts which disseminate false information during election campaigns (Кабар, 2018). Disinformation In response to the circulation of disinformation in Kyrgyzstan, Factcheck was set up to debunk online rumours (Центр-1, 2018). The organisation’s chief editor Bolot Temirov says he receives five to six fake reports a day, some originating on WhatsApp and other messaging apps. Government ministries also intervene to correct mis- and disinformation. A message spreading on WhatsApp claimed that the Ministry of Labour and Social Development was handing out 70,000 soms [US$1,000] to people who worked between 1991-2018. This was denied by the ministry in an official statement (Мокренко, 2018). The Ministry of Internal Affairs (2018) also issued a statement warning against anonymous posts from Telegraph (telegra.ph), which circulated deliberately false information targeting government and law enforcement officials. Polarization Freedom House (2019) suggested that Internet users self-censor on issues concerning ethnic relations, as online forums are strictly moderated to limit hateful content. Interethnic relations in the South are a sensitive matter as that region is where the majority of the country’s Uzbek minority lives. A court in Batken sentenced a man to four years in prison for inciting ethnic hatred on WhatsApp after circulating a video of a fight between “two different ethnic groups” and calling for the “elimination of an ethnic minority” in the region (RFE/RL, 2019). 236