hack into web servers and computers used by newsrooms and journalists, though such laws are currently still in draft (Freedom House, 2019) and their passing into legislation is uncertain. However, in the summer of 2020 the government finalised legislation that would German intelligence to infiltrate IT devices (e.g. computers, smartphones, etc.) through so-called “Staatstrojaner” to wiretap and record communication. The law is expected to pass without any further issues, and experts remain critical that it leaves legal and technological uncertainties unaddressed (Meister, 2020). Meanwhile, in February 2019 the Administrative court of Cologne ruled that the German domestic intelligence service, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), is not allowed to declare the entire AfD a case for heightened scrutiny as it would ‘convey a negative effect to the public’. The AfD had previously called out the declaration as politically motivated, and subsequently went on to legally challenge it in front of the court in Cologne (Deutsche Welle, 2019; Boyd, 2019). Such examples showcase the tight judicial oversight to ensure that any infringement on freedoms is appropriate. Misinformation from foreign countries, mainly Russia, is also becoming an increasing concern for the government. Russia has established channels such as RT and Redfish, which are especially present on Facebook and YouTube (Figure 2). The main focus of these channels has been right-wing topics supporting the party AfD or the extreme right-wing movement Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (Pegida). However, recently (with reports emerging from late 2018) they also appear seem to be taking up left-wing and green topics too. This development has led to demands from politicians across party lines to increase the governmental fight against misinformation to ensure that the public decision-making process is not affected, especially in light of the upcoming EU election. These channels present themselves as a new form of grass-roots journalism for anybody who is frustrated with mainstream media. Even politicians themselves are sometimes unaware of the background of the media sources with which they are engaging: Green Party MP Canan Bayram for example gave an interview to Redfish and was only made aware of their connection to Russia later (see Figure 3 for example post) (Wiebe, 2018; Wiebe, 2018). Additionally, a network of Twitter bots and trolls thought to be connected to the Russian Internet Research Agency have been observed to run temporary influence operations to polarise debates during elections and other political events (e.g. the refugee crisis in 2015). While many Tweets are shared in Russian and English over 100,000 were German and for the most part emanating from accounts that can be perceived as real and human-operated by most other users (Holland, 2018). To counter such disinformation and propaganda about Germany both domestically and internationally the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a unit for strategic communication in 2016. Their aim is to understand online communication and provide objective and reliable information through campaigns such as “Rumours about Germany”. The ministry has specifically stated that this unit is to inform and not produce counterpropaganda to Russia or the Islamic State (Auswärtiges Amt, 2018; la Cour, 2019). 146