to monitor other dissidents and encourage them to break the law (Freedom House, 2017). Thus, while the government does not usually engage in content removal directly, it silences dissent and fosters self-censorship through its physical intimidation tactics (Freedom House, 2019b). Critics of the government who have sought exile abroad have been targeted for producing critical content about the government. According to an article by WIRED Magazine citing research by Citizens Lab, dissidents in 20 countries, including Germany, USA and Canada were targeted by Ethiopian government agencies through spyware embedded in emails containing a malicious link (see figure 1 for all countries). The spyware – PC Surveillance System – was produced by Cyberbit, an Israeli firm and subsidiary of the defence contractor Elbit Systems (Deibert, 2017; Marczak et al., 2017). In relation to disinformation operations, it appears that for the most part the Ethiopian government makes use of misinformation and social media largely to the extent that it blames it for violence and conflict in the country. Citing this relationship, legislation against hate speech and disinformation on social media was passed in early 2020 that has raised concerns about online freedoms (Freedom House, 2019a; Freedom House, 2019b; Internet Sans Frontières, 2020). Journalists and activists alike are worried that the legislation will be used to further limit free speech and censor online content: internet users and platform operators who violate the law face up to three years in prison and fines of up to USD $3,145. Essentially, the law could allow for the government and security forces to track down and punish critics (Al Jazeera, 2020; Cascais, 2020). However, there is also substance to the argument that ethnic tensions are being exacerbated through social media. There are numerous examples of links between social media activity and ethnic violence in recent years (Chala, 2019). It is uncertain to what extent the government’s intention is to suppress ethnic violence, rather than silencing dissent. The past government (before 2015) was known to have an army of trolls to engage in online disinformation operations, despite the country’s low internet penetration rate (Freedom House, 2019b). In 2014 a report from the Ethiopian Satellite Television Service accused the Ethiopian government of training bloggers to undermine online content that was critical of the government. In the second round of recruiting 235 people were trained, such that 2,350 Facebook, Twitter and blog accounts had subsequently been opened (ECADF, 2014). It remains unclear, however, if the present government has continued with these activities, though accusations have been made (Freedom House, 2019b). In late 2017 and early 2018 information began circling online that the Ethiopian government was again hiring social media trolls. Documents were shared on Facebook that showed chat logs, and lists of names and emails who appeared to have been paid to promote the ruling government and harass opponents on social media (Chala, 2018). Table 2: Observed Strategies, Tools and Techniques of Social Media Manipulation in Ethiopia Account Types Messaging and Valence Content and Platforms Communication Strategies Human, Support hacked/impersonated Attack Opposition accounts Suppression Trolls Facebook Twitter Other blogs Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. 137