According to a report by the Crisis Group there is a coordinated effort to manipulate the online debate about the domestic political agenda, which has manifested in the opposing hashtags #BukeleDictador and #QueBonitaDictadura (Dictator Bukele and What a Lovely Dictatorship, respectively). The hashtag #BukeleDictador was first published in February 2020 when the government ordered the entrance of military troops to the building of the Legislative Assembly and it was also used to criticize his management of COVID-19 response. Contrastingly, #QueBonitaDictadura was used for supporters of Bukele and against critics by the press. Analysis of posts related to both hashtags between 27 April and 9 May 2020 show signs of the use of fake accounts created recently and automation. Also, between 4.4 and 5.6 percent of posts were originated from accounts that were deactivated later in May. (Esberg, 2020). Apart from fake accounts, political elites play a significant role in amplifying content. Whilst they account for less than 1.5% of posts, their influence is disproportionate. Crisis Group report also shows that “Deputy Alexandra Ramírez, whom the government alleges coordinated the FMLN troll centre”, boosted the hashtag #BukeleDictador and that Porfirio Chica was the person who first published #QueBonitaDictadura (Esberg, 2020). The government has also made use of trolls. Nelson Rauda, journalist at media outlet El Faro, was widely criticized after an intervention during a press conference. Some content was first published at pro-Bukele website La Britany and then disseminated by public servants and the president himself, including death threats (Cascante, 2020). Two Twitter fake accounts were created to target the journalist and his family (Pozzebon, 2020) Finally, it is worth noting that during the Coronavirus pandemic, Bukele posted tweets with misleading information. For instance, he stated that the Italian health system had collapsed and that a specific flight from Mexico to San Salvador was carrying twelve confirmed cases of Covid-19. However, the Italian embassy in El Salvador and Mexico’s Foreign Minister, respectively, denied the information (Meléndez, 2020). Table 2: Observed Strategies, Tools and Techniques of Social Media Manipulation in El Salvador Content and Communication Platforms Account Types Messaging and Valence Bots and human Real and Fake Support, Attacks on opposition, Driving polaritzation, Trolling Strategies Trolls, Amplifying content Twitter, Facebook Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. Organizational Capacity and Resources There are no details about how cyber troops in El Salvador are organized nor the resources allocated for their activities. Table 3: Cyber Troop Capacity in El Salvador Team Size Resources Spent Activity Levels (USD) Coordination Capacity Measure Temporary Decentralised Low Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. 130