15. The State has greatly consolidated control over access to the internet since 2015. The State gave a military conglomerate a telecoms licence, together with regulatory leeway in order to establish a large subscriber base, effectively reversing earlier deregulation which saw foreign private providers both gain market dominance and vastly increase internet access.49 As a result, the State has regained direct authority over more than half of all mobile subscribers, which, combined with the lack of privacy, data protection, and communications interception safeguards, has given the State unprecedented opportunities to surveil the public and interfere with FoEI.50 Not content with authority over more than half of mobile subscribers, the State has also further interfered with FoEI by directing telecoms providers to effectively cut off millions of mobile telecoms subscribers who do not disclose their official IDs when registering a SIM card.51 Many marginalised groups do not have official IDs, and others are concerned about the risk of State surveillance and interference in FoEI.52 16. In 2019, the State activated a previously unused provision in the Telecommunications Law, directing mobile telecoms providers to shut down access to the internet in conflict-ridden Rakhine and Chin States.53 The shutdown directive has not been published and the State has only ambiguously justified it in a short statement referencing vague and overly broad national security concerns.54 Despite FEM’s joint campaigns and widespread public awareness,55 the shutdown is now the world’s longest and currently restricts internet access for 1.4 million people.56 In 2020, the State activated another previously unused provision in the Telecommunications Law, issuing a series of directives each ordering telecoms providers to block access to certain websites.57 In a repeat of the interference in FoEI seen during the shutdown process, the blocking directives have not been published and only been ambiguously justified with references to “fake news” and national security concerns. Although the directives have not been published, tests have shown over 2,000 websites have been blocked so far, including news websites and pro-Rohingya websites.58 Right to protest 17. 5 countries:59 “Reform laws to protect the right to protest” – No implementation. No change. Since 2015, at least 229 individuals have been convicted for their non-violent protests, mostly under the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law which interferes in FoEI by criminalising protesting.60 Following FEM’s joint campaign, a superficial amendment of the law replaced “permission to protest” with a vague “application to protest”.61 Most police interpret the amended law as meaning protesters must abide by all the police’s directives on locations, timings, and even slogans, else the application is not accepted.62 Similarly, if protests deviate from the accepted application, for example by protesters shouting new slogans, the application is voided.63 A rejected or voided application renders the protest unlawful.64 Spontaneous protests also remain unlawful in effect because protesters cannot apply in advance.65 Those who organise or participate in unlawful protests can then be arrested, and all those arrested face collective culpability, long and slow trials, and a 100% conviction rate.66 Another proposed amendment which would further interfere in FoEI by requiring protest organisers to include information about funding sources in their application remains in opaque limbo.67 www.FreeExpressionMyanmar.org – www.facebook.com/FreeExpressionMyanmar - coordinator@FreeExpressionMyanmar.org - page 4