Vietnam
reportedly found that TikTok has stored
information that is considered to violate
the law on its domestic servers, including
fake information, distortion, and incitement
of violence395.
As of 2023, TikTok is the only platform
that has an office in Vietnam, which is
the reason why the company could be
probed by authorities. Having a local office
in a country that imposes digital repression
can be a potential risk to a company, as
the government can impose sanctions
to make t he company comply with
government orders. As the platform has
around 50 million users in Vietnam, ranking
among the highest in the world, many have
been concerned about what would be the
company’s next steps to protect its user
base396.
In addition, the Vietnamese government
strategy to control content also includes the
deployment of “opinion-shapers” to police
content on social media platforms and shape
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
public opinion. Known to the public is Force
47, an army unit tasked to “fight proactively
against the wrong views”397, 398. There are
also “public opinion shapers” who are
reportedly civilians who share the same
ideology with the CPV and do the work as
volunteers399,400. A report described them
as recruited from young CPV members and
the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union401.
In the past, a now defunct Facebook group
called “E47”, a name that is a clear reference
to Force 47, also worked in coordination
with the latter to target specific Facebook
accounts considered as opposing the
CPV402.
Reuters reported that Force 47 was created
in 2016, which then set up hundreds of
Facebook groups and pages to publish
thousands of pro-government articles and
posts 403. When the cyber army became
publicly known in 2017, the group reportedly
had around around 10,000 personnel 404.
While some reports describe the unit as
Ibid.
Kemp, Simon. “Digital 2023: Vietnam.” DataReportal, 13 Feb. 2023, datareportal.com/reports/digital-2023-vietnam.
Biddle, Sam. “Facebook Lets Vietnam’s Cyberarmy Target Dissidents, Rejecting a Celebrity’s Plea.” The
Intercept, 21 Dec. 2020, theintercept.com/2020/12/21/facebook-vietnam-censorship.
Luong, Dien Nguyen An. “2021/22 ‘How the Vietnamese State Uses Cyber Troops to Shape Online Discourse’.”
ISEAS, 2021, www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-22-how-the-vietnamesestate-uses-cyber-troops-to-shape-online-discourse-by-dien-nguyen-an-luong.
Ibid.
Biddle, Sam. “Facebook Lets Vietnam’s Cyberarmy Target Dissidents, Rejecting a Celebrity’s Plea.” The
Intercept, 21 Dec. 2020, theintercept.com/2020/12/21/facebook-vietnam-censorship.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Pearson, James. “Insight: How Vietnam’s ‘Influencer’ Army Wages Information Warfare on Facebook.” Reuters,
9 July 2021, www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-vietnams-influencer-army-wages-informationwarfare-facebook-2021-07-09.
“Vietnam Unveils 10,000-strong Cyber Unit to Combat ‘Wrong Views.’” Reuters, 26 Dec. 2017, www.reuters.
com/article/idUSKBN1EK0XB.
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