The‌‌vast‌‌majority‌‌of‌‌this‌‌campaign‌‌fell‌‌flat‌‌among‌‌the‌‌audiences‌‌it‌‌targeted,‌‌with‌‌nearly‌‌all‌‌its‌‌ Instagram‌‌posts‌‌receiving‌‌zero‌‌likes.‌‌At‌‌the‌‌time‌‌of‌‌this‌‌writing,‌‌its‌‌English-language‌‌petition‌‌on‌‌ Change[.]org‌‌gained‌‌only‌‌about‌‌550‌‌signatures,‌‌and‌‌its‌‌Hindi-language‌‌petition‌‌gained‌‌less‌‌than‌‌ 900‌‌signatures.‌‌Only‌‌the‌‌paid‌‌influencers’‌‌posts‌‌attracted‌‌some‌‌limited‌‌attention.‌‌However,‌‌this‌‌ reliance‌‌on‌‌external‌‌influencers‌‌became‌‌the‌‌operation’s‌‌undoing—‌‌in‌‌May,‌‌a‌‌handful‌‌of‌‌them‌‌ exposed‌‌the‌‌anti-Pfizer‌‌efforts.‌ ‌ This‌‌continues‌‌the‌‌trend‌‌we‌‌highlighted‌‌in‌‌our‌‌recent‌‌T ‌ hreat‌‌Report‌—‌‌influence‌‌operations‌‌ increasingly‌‌target‌‌authentic‌‌influential‌‌voices‌‌to‌‌carry‌‌their‌‌messages.‌‌Through‌‌them,‌‌deceptive‌‌ campaigns‌‌gain‌‌access‌‌to‌‌the‌‌influencer’s‌‌ready-made‌‌audience,‌‌but‌‌it‌‌comes‌‌with‌‌a‌‌significant‌‌risk‌‌ of‌‌exposure.‌ ‌ Another‌‌aspect‌‌of‌‌this‌‌campaign‌‌worth‌‌highlighting‌‌is‌‌its‌‌operations‌‌across‌‌multiple‌‌internet‌‌ services‌‌at‌‌once,‌‌which‌‌makes‌‌it‌‌more‌‌challenging‌‌for‌‌any‌‌one‌‌platform‌‌to‌‌see‌‌the‌‌full‌‌picture‌‌and‌‌ take‌‌action‌‌on‌‌the‌‌whole‌‌of‌‌the‌‌campaign.‌‌This‌‌is‌‌why‌‌a‌‌whole-of-society‌‌response‌‌to‌‌such‌‌ disinformation‌‌campaigns‌‌is‌‌critical.‌‌The‌‌influencers‌‌who‌‌came‌‌forward‌‌in‌‌G ‌ ermany‌‌‌and‌‌F ‌ rance‌‌ played‌‌a‌‌key‌‌role‌‌in‌‌exposing‌‌the‌‌first‌‌clue‌‌to‌‌this‌‌activity.‌‌Open-source‌‌researchers‌‌and‌‌journalists‌‌ were‌‌able‌‌to‌‌report‌‌on‌‌much‌‌of‌‌the‌‌operation’s‌‌May‌‌activity.‌‌Our‌‌internal‌‌investigation‌‌led‌‌to‌‌ uncovering‌‌the‌‌full‌‌scope‌‌of‌‌this‌‌network‌‌on‌‌our‌‌platform,‌‌including‌‌its‌‌activity‌‌in‌‌2020,‌‌which‌‌we‌‌ shared‌‌with‌‌our‌‌industry‌‌peers.‌‌Our‌‌analysis‌‌benefited‌‌from‌‌research‌‌by‌‌CNN,‌‌The‌‌Daily‌‌Beast‌‌and‌‌ Graphika.‌‌This‌‌collaboration‌‌between‌‌different‌‌members‌‌of‌‌the‌‌community‌‌is‌‌vital‌‌to‌‌exposing‌‌ influence‌‌operations‌‌and‌‌understanding‌‌their‌‌impact.‌ ‌ Still,‌‌some‌‌questions‌‌remain‌‌about‌‌aspects‌‌of‌‌this‌‌campaign‌‌—‌‌including‌‌who‌‌commissioned‌‌Fazze‌‌ to‌‌run‌‌it‌‌—‌‌that‌‌would‌‌benefit‌‌from‌‌further‌‌research‌‌by‌‌the‌‌defender‌‌community.‌‌One‌‌feature‌‌of‌‌ these‌‌for-hire‌‌influence‌‌operations‌‌is‌‌that‌‌they‌‌allow‌‌the‌‌ultimate‌‌beneficiary‌‌to‌‌obfuscate‌‌their‌‌ involvement.‌‌Another‌‌question‌‌relates‌‌to‌‌how‌‌the‌‌“hacked‌‌and‌‌leaked”‌‌document‌‌came‌‌into‌‌ Fazze’s‌‌hands.‌‌As‌‌with‌‌any‌‌influence‌‌operation,‌‌understanding‌‌the‌‌motive‌‌behind‌‌leaks‌‌like‌‌these‌‌is‌‌ key‌‌to‌‌putting‌‌the‌‌operation‌‌in‌‌context.‌ ‌ As‌‌part‌‌of‌‌disrupting‌‌this‌‌operation,‌‌we‌‌took‌‌down‌‌their‌‌accounts,‌‌including‌‌authentic‌‌assets‌‌of‌‌ the‌‌people‌‌behind‌‌this‌‌network,‌‌and‌‌blocked‌‌domains‌‌associated‌‌with‌‌their‌‌activity.‌‌We‌‌also‌‌ notified‌‌people‌‌who‌‌we‌‌believe‌‌may‌‌have‌‌been‌‌contacted‌‌by‌‌this‌‌network‌‌and‌‌shared‌‌our‌‌findings‌‌ with‌‌law‌‌enforcement,‌‌independent‌‌researchers,‌‌policy-makers‌‌and‌‌our‌‌industry‌‌peers‌‌so‌‌they‌‌too‌‌ can‌‌take‌‌action‌‌if‌‌they‌‌find‌‌violating‌‌activity.‌‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ____________________________________________________________________________________‌ ‌ JULY‌‌2021‌‌COORDINATED‌‌INAUTHENTIC‌‌BEHAVIOR‌‌REPORT‌ 8‌ ‌