ASIAN ETHNICITY 3 against ethnic armed groups, burned down villages, and tortured and killed individuals suspected of supporting rebel organizations, while making ceasefire deals with several others to bolster its position and penetrate areas previously controlled by non-state armed groups.8 The SLORC also placed restrictions on media freedom and the cultural and religious activities of ethnic minorities, including ethnic Literature and Cultural Committees, which focus on ethnic affairs and teaching respective languages, and print­ ing and broadcasting in minority languages.9 Government-controlled media broadcast in minority languages to disseminate state propaganda and was used as a tool for Burmanization.10 Myanmar appeared to make a transition to democracy in 2011, after the military held multiparty elections, which were won overwhelmingly by the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). The second general elections in 2015 wit­ nessed an overwhelming victory of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) and the subsequent appointment of Myanmar’s first civilian government since 1962. Democratic reforms since 2011 created elected seats for ethnic affairs ministers, lifted restrictions on ethnic minority media and social and cultural activities, and led to the formation of the union-level Ministry of Ethnic Affairs, mandated by the National Race Protection Law.11 However, minority languages are still not officially recognized through the Constitution, nor was recognition of these languages part of the NLD’s agenda for constitutional change. The ongoing war between Myanmar’s army and several ethnic armed groups have resulted in government shutdowns of the internet and Facebook in these conflict areas where minorities reside.12 While Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution gave some limited legislative and administrative powers to regional govern­ ments (half of which are named after ethnic minorities who constitute the largest populations in their respective states), major political and economic decisions are still the remit of the central government. Myanmar’s democratic transition also introduced an unprecedented technological transformation and the sudden, widespread connection of the public to the internet. People across the country can now afford to buy mobile phone SIM cards for less than a dollar, a 2000-fold price drop from 2010. Mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants stood at 1.18 in 2010 before rising to 55.91 by 2014 and 95.65 by 2016.13 Mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants rose from 0.02 per 100 people in 2011 to 56.30 in 2016.14 Consequently, a combination of the political transition and the spread of the global popularity of social media platforms, particularly Facebook, has given Myanmar’s urban and rural population, including minority ethnic groups, with easy and instant access to digital communication and information. Facebook’s popularity in Myanmar has grown exponentially. Nearly 20 million people in Myanmar, or about 40% of the country’s total population, have used the social media platform.15 Compared to the earlier government use of radio in Myanmar to broadcast ethnic language content to deliver propaganda to placate ‘unruly’ minority groups, promote linguistic diversity and facilitate standardization,16 Facebook allows more interactive uses of written language by grassroots populations. This growing access to information and means of communication has contributed to greater freedom of expres­ sion and association, but also the spread of misinformation and hate speech. Evidence shows that Myanmar’s armed forces (known in the Burmese language as the Tatmadaw) and extremist nationalist groups have deliberately used Facebook to spread messages of