Clashes are “contactless,” using precision capabilities that target non-combatants (i.e., civilian populations, news media and/or the private sector).10 Technique and tactics While there is some variation in the descriptions of the specific steps taken to implement information operations, a central sequence of practices across these sources makes up the “Digital Disinformation Playbook:”11 Targeting: Propagators of disinformation operations carry out intelligence collection on their target audiences via open-source channels on the web and analysis gathered by digital advertising agencies. Content creation: Operatives create and curate emotionally resonant or otherwise inciteful content (audio/visual, text-based information) for weaponization, including propaganda, misinformation and disinformation. Dissemination: Narratives are systematically disseminated through multiple means, fusing together social and traditional media, as well as offline channels such as printed materials or public rallies.12 Amplification: Propagated narratives are then amplified via botnets, inauthentic accounts, influencers, hashtag hijacking, astroturfing13 (imitating grass-roots actions using coordinated inauthentic accounts) and trading up the chain14 (planting stories in small outlets where they can then be picked up by larger ones). Distraction: All actors within the system work together to prevent objective sense-making within the target zone of operations by creating distractions, disrupting telecommunications infrastructure or banning social media platforms. Impacts and implications The Syria Campaign, with research from Graphika, estimates that “bots and trolls linked to other Russian disinformation campaigns have reached an estimated 56 million people on Twitter with posts related to the White Helmets during ten key news moments of 2016 and 2017.”15 These online defamation campaigns attempt to delegitimize the White Helmets’ status as a neutral and impartial humanitarian actor in an attempt to make them a legitimate target for kinetic attacks.16 Over 210 white helmet volunteers have been killed 10 Svetoka, 9-11; Lucas and Pomeranzev, 11. 11 See T.E. Nissen Framework – Svetoka, 11; Facebook “Information Operations,” 2016; Lucas and Pomeranzev, 6; Sarah Oh and Travis Adkins, “Disinformation Toolkit” (InterAction: June 2018), 11; Giorgio Bertolin, “Digital Hydra: Security Implications of False Information Online,” (NATO StratCom COE: May 2016), 8-9; Hossein Derakhshan and Claire Wardle, “Information Disorder: Definitions” in Understanding and Addressing the Disinformation Ecosystem (Annenberg School of Communication: 2017); Livingston, “Contentious Narratives” 2018; CRS 9-10; Lucas and Pomeranzev, “Winning the information War” 2018. 12 While mixed media information campaigns use multiple social media channels and website-based platforms to perpetuate and amplify the reach of a single narrative, cross-media campaigns leverage a central channel around which the campaign is built and hyperlinked to. Both are extremely effective at masking inauthenticity. See Bertolin, 40-42. 13 Russian IO fuse astroturfing (imitating grass-roots actions using coordinated inauthentic accounts) with hybrid-trolling (deliberately provocative behavior that aims to distort online discussions and cause conflict among participants in order to advance ideological, political, or military objectives). (Bertolin, 29). 14 According to Marwick and Lewis, “media manipulators are able to trade stories “up the chain” of media outlets…by planting a story with a small or local news outlet who may be too understaffed or financially strained to sufficiently fact-check it. If the story performs well enough…it gets amplified beyond its current scope.” (Marwick and Lewis, 38-39). 15 The Syria Campaign and Graphika, “Killing the Truth: How Russia is Fuelling a Disinformation Campaign to Cover up War Crimes in Syria, 2017, 13. 16 For example, “KARMA IS A BITCH -> #WhiteHelmets killed. That will teach you to kill innocent children to fake #syriachemicalattack!! #Syriahoax #MFAnews.” (@BinsakSB). Furthermore “Those at the heart of these conspiracy theories, such as Vanessa Beeley, call for the White Helmets to be killed as legitimate military targets.” See The Syria Campaign, 2017. MERCY CORPS The Weaponization of Social Media: How social media can spark violence and what can be done about it 9