individuals are particularly susceptible to ISIS’ re-branded, inclusive messaging and viral, accessible content.127 Through the two main production companies within the Islamic State (Al-Hayat and Al-Furqan), media operatives produce propaganda films (such as the so-called “mujatweets”) that are shared on social platforms, circulate monthly magazines (such as Dabiq), live stream updates from the front lines, design video-games, and even circulate job advertisements.128 Highlighting themes of openness, inclusion, and participation.129 Through coordinated messaging campaigns, ISIS recruits are shown a sense of purpose, collective identity and meaning.130 ISIS media operatives also place stories of ordinary fighters front and center, humanizing extremists through relatable messaging and contextualizing radicalization within local grievances and community perspectives.131 Personal videos and photos from the front lines are effective recruitment and “symbolic currencies” that are used to drive user engagement and radicalization.132 Moving recruits toward radicalization one step at a time. Exposure to one set of ideas can open the door for other, more radical thinking to take root. This incremental conditioning process, known as “red-pilling” in certain internet subcultures, normalizes extremist views over time and erodes the capacity for objective reasoning.133 Once potential recruits and supporters have been inundated with pro-ISIS content, recruiters move to more private communications channels, such as encrypted messaging applications (i.e., WhatsApp or Telegram, Kik, Threema, etc.) or Skype for more targeted, personalized and intimate one-onone outreach that makes targets feel included, valued and part of a community.134 Mobilizing and coordinating operations. Social media are also leveraged for mobilizing supporters, sharing information and coordinating tactical operations. The use of social media for these purposes “is important for non-state actors such as insurgent groups, particularly if these groups lack formal structure or are dispersed over large geographical areas.”135 In this way, the information environment is a key resource, staging ground and site of conflict for extremist efforts. Violent extremist groups have leveraged social media for targeting and intelligence gathering and sharing logistical information between geographically dispersed groups. According to NATO, these platforms, channels and networks are used to identify potential targets for military actions, as usergenerated content, participatory maps and user metadata become resources for actionable intelligence in conflict zones and other inaccessible environments. Social media are also a conduit for sharing training or instructional materials. This includes information pertaining to local travel conditions, how to stage attacks and how to mask communications from law enforcement.136 Operatives share step-by-step instructions on how to build and deploy weapons such as 127 Wilson, 3, 8; Gerstel, 1; and Bertolin, 22. 128 Wilson, 5. 129 See Charlie Winter, “Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare,” International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR), (2017), pg. 15-16. 130 Gerstel, 2. 131 See Saltman and Winter, 43; Brendan Koerner, “#jihad: Why ISIS Is Winning the Social Media War” WIRED Magazine (March 2016); and Wilson, 7. 132 Wilson, 3. 133 Marwick and Lewis, 29. Importantly, people that become red-pilled in one ideological area are more likely to be red-pilled in others: susceptibility for red-pilling is an indicator for and entry point of Islamic radicalization (Freelon, 18). 134 Gerstel, 3. 135 Svetoka, 15-16. 136 Zeitzoff, 10; Catherine Theohary and John Rollins, “Terrorist Use of the Internet: Information Operations in Cyberspace” (Congressional Research Service (CRS): March, 2011), 12-13; Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, “ISIS in America: From ReTweets to Raqqa” (Program on Extremism GWU: December 2015), 20-21 MERCY CORPS The Weaponization of Social Media: How social media can spark violence and what can be done about it 51